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The Supreme Court first heard an Establishment Clause challenge to 
the practice of legislative prayer over three decades ago in Marsh v. 
Chambers.1  It has heard a second challenge this Term in Town of Greece v. 
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 1. See Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983) (upholding the Nebraska 
Legislature’s practice of opening each legislative day with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the 
State). 
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Galloway,2 but has not yet rendered a decision at the time of this 
publication. 
Between Marsh and Galloway, the Court has decided several cases 
concerning other types of religious speech by government.  This religious 
speech includes nativity scenes and “Ten Commandments” shrines in town 
halls and courthouses,3 the words “Under God” in the Pledge of 
Allegiance,4 the printing of “In God We Trust” on money,5 and so on. 
The controversies surrounding this speech are highly charged.  Yet the 
actual litigation resulting from them puts relatively little at stake.  The 
religious-minority plaintiffs urge that they have been made to feel like 
“outsiders in the political community.”6  This kind of stigmatic 
harm,however genuine, rarely carries much independent weight in other 
areas of the law.7  On the other hand, the government defendants cite what 
Justice Scalia would call “the interest of the overwhelming majority of 
                                                                                                     
 2. See generally Town of Greece, N.Y. v. Galloway, 133 S. Ct. 2388 (2013) 
(granting certiorari). 
 3. See generally Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh 
Ch., 492 U.S. 573 (1989); see also Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005); McCreary 
Cnty. v. Am. Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 4. See generally Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 541 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 5. See generally O’Hair v. Murray, 588 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1979); Gaylor v. United 
States, 74 F.3d 214 (10th Cir. 1996); Aronow v. United States, 432 F.2d 242 (9th Cir. 1970). 
 6. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[G]overnment endorsement or disapproval of religion . . . sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an accompanying 
message to adherents that they are insiders, favored members of the political community.”); 
see also Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 
573, 595 (quoting Lynch); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 309–10 
(2000) (quoting Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688); Samuel J. Levine, Toward a Religious Minority 
Voice: A Look at Free Exercise Law Through a Religious Minority Perspective, 5 WM. & 
MARY BILL RTS. J. 153, 155–56 (1996) (discussing how the experience of religious 
minorities as political outsiders can be compared to the experiences of groups such as 
feminists and racial minorities). 
 7. With limited exceptions, for instance, the law traditionally does not allow 
collection for emotional distress in negligence suits without some showing of a physical 
impact.  See 38 AM. JUR. 2D Fright, Shock, Etc. § 12 (2013).  When emotional distress is 
inflicted intentionally, a plaintiff must demonstrate that the distress was “severe” and that the 
behavior was “extreme and outrageous.”  See 43 AM. JUR. 2D Proof of Facts 1 (1985).  
Similarly, sexual harassment claims premised on a hostile work environment theory rest on 
mental distress, but require a showing that the harassment was severe.  See 78 A.L.R. Fed. 
252 (1986).  Mental suffering is rarely considered as an element of damages in contract law.  
See 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages § 49 (2013).  Also see infra at n. 200 (discussing failure of 
equal protection claims based on emotional distress resulting from incorporation of 
Confederate battle flag into official state insignia). 
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religious believers in being able to give God thanks and supplication as a 
people.”8  But even if we grant that giving God thanks and supplication as a 
people feels different from giving thanks or supplication as a church or as a 
family or as another private organization, that feeling is surely an “interest” 
at least as abstract as the interest in “not feeling excluded,”9 and also of the 
sort disfavored elsewhere in the law.10 
The overall character of these cases is indeed so abstract that it tends 
to boil down to a story of my indignation versus your indignation.  The 
important question—namely, whose indignation is more justified under the 
circumstances—depends on what Justice O’Connor referred to as the 
“judicial interpretation of social facts.” 11  These “social facts” are left out 
of the hands of juries and are reviewable de novo on appeal.12  They 
concern, among other things, what sort of message a town sends to an 
“objective observer” when it installs a Ten Commandments monument 
                                                                                                     
 8. McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. at 900 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original). 
 9. Id. (internal quotation omitted). 
 10. See Thomas Colby, A Constitutional Hierarchy of Religions?  Justice Scalia, the 
Ten Commandments, and the Future of the Establishment Clause, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1097, 
1119 (2006).  Professor Colby eloquently critiques Justice Scalia’s majoritarian logic by 
substituting race for religion: 
Imagine if this reasoning had been employed in Brown v. Board of Education: 
  
In the context of segregation in public schools there are legitimate competing 
interests: On the one hand, the interest of that minority in not feeling “inferior;” 
but on the other, the interest of the overwhelming majority of Kansans in being 
able to educate their children in the presence of members of their own race 
alone. Our national tradition has resolved that conflict in favor of the majority. 
  
What a sad Constitution that would be.  
Id. at 1119. 
 11. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 12. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 76 (1985) (O'Connor, J., concurring); Adam 
M. Samaha, Endorsement Retires:  From Religious Symbols to Anti-Sorting Principles, 2005 
SUP. CT. REV. 135, 136 (2005) (“The reason for this allocation of power is not evident from 
the nature of the test.  Roughly speaking, the query is whether a reasonable observer would 
think that the government sent a message favoring religion over non-religion. Context 
matters, including the community setting.  Juries regularly answer questions like this.  
Negligence cases call for somewhat similar judgment.  Even better, juries may determine 
whether speech is so offensive to community standards that it qualifies as obscenity.”);  see 
also Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 768 n.3 (1995) 
(plurality opinion) (asking as an aside whether it should be juries who decide these 
questions).  
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outside a Courthouse;13 whether a menorah is a religious or a secular 
symbol;14 and how a nonobservant high schooler would feel during an 
official prayer at a football game.15 
The power of this fact finding to shape the outcome of a case almost 
irrespective of the legal standard being applied stands as the one constant in 
an area of law notorious for its caprice.16  The various theoretical constructs 
advanced by the Justices—the government should not “endorse” religion; 
should not “coerce” religious compliance; should act “neutrally”—give 
little real guidance to lawyers.  If the point of the law is to predict what the 
judge will do with your case, as Holmes believed,17 then where the Justices 
make real law is in their findings of social fact:  a nativity scene 
impermissibly endorses religion when it is placed in the “most beautiful” 
part of a courthouse,18 but not if it is surrounded by reindeer;19 prayers at 
                                                                                                     
 13. See McCreary Cnty., 545 U.S. 844, 862–63 (finding that there was a 
predominantly religious purpose behind the Ten Commandments display); see also Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. 677, 691–92 (2005) (finding that the placement of a Ten Commandments 
monument on the Texas State Capitol grounds was “far more passive” that its usage in other 
cases and that the monument had a “dual significance” in being grouped with other 
historical, non-religious monuments). 
 14. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 613–21. 
 15. See Doe, 530 U.S. 290. 
 16. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, The Unpredictability of the Supreme Court’s Doctrine 
in Establishment Clause Cases, 43 WAYNE L. REV. 1439 (1997) (arguing that the Supreme 
Court “has failed to adopt coherent principles of law governing the Establishment Clause”). 
 17. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 
167, 173 (1920) (describing the law as “[t]he prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, 
and nothing more pretentious. . .”). 
 18. See Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 
U.S. 573, 579–81, 594–602 (1989). 
 19. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 671 (1984) (approvingly describing a 
nativity scene’s surroundings: “a Santa Claus house, reindeer pulling Santa’s sleigh, candy-
striped poles, a Christmas tree, carolers, cutout figures representing such characters as a 
clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, hundreds of colored lights, a large banner that reads 
‘SEASONS GREETINGS,’ and the crèche at issue here”); see id. at 692–93 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (explaining that the nativity scene’s “features combine to make the 
government’s display of the crèche in this particular physical setting no more an 
endorsement of religion than such governmental ‘acknowledgments’ of religion as 
legislative prayers . . .”); Joshua D. Zarrow, Of Crosses and Creches: The Establishment 
Clause and Publicly Sponsored Displays of Religious Symbols, 35 AM. U. L. REV. 477, 495 
(1986) (describing Lynch as establishing a “two plastic reindeer rule”); Am. Jewish Cong. v. 
City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1987) (invalidating a nativity scene under 
Lynch because “[i]n this case, . . .  therefore, unlike Lynch, the secularized decorations in the 
vicinity of the nativity scene were not clearly part of the same display”). 
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graduation ceremonies coerce graduating students into participating;20 the 
phrase “In God We Trust” has lost its religious meaning through rote 
repetition.21  Analogy to these factual findings offers practitioners and 
policymakers a far more reliable guide than any application of the Court’s 
“tests.” 
In this article, I discuss the Court’s attempts between Marsh and 
Galloway to apply its tests to questions of governmental religious speech.  I 
begin in Part I with Marsh, which avoided tests altogether.  Instead, Marsh 
upheld legislative prayer based on its historical pedigree and its continuing 
widespread practice.22   
Marsh is in this respect an anomaly among the government religious 
speech cases; later opinions, though they disagree on which test to apply, at 
least purport to apply some test or another based on a larger understanding 
of the Establishment Clause’s purposes.  I discuss these tests in Part II.  Yet 
I argue that these tests have proven so pliable in the hands of Justices 
willing to interpret the social facts creatively that Marsh, in its lawlessness, 
emerges as less of an exception than it would appear. 
In Part III I discuss Galloway, the upcoming legislative prayer case.  
Galloway’s impact could easily be limited to the law of legislative prayer, 
as the Court has for years treated legislative prayer, and Marsh, as a 
jurisprudential island.  But Galloway’s municipal defendants seem to have 
angled for something larger—namely, a confrontation between test-free 
Marsh and the “endorsement test,” which the courts currently consult to 
decide most matters involving the constitutionality of government religious 
speech.  The “endorsement test,” which I explain below, is vulnerable on 
the current Supreme Court, which may well take Galloway as an invitation 
to bring it down.  But more interestingly, Galloway may set the stage for a 
                                                                                                     
 20. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 593 (1992) (“The undeniable fact is that the 
school district’s supervision and control of a high school graduation ceremony places public 
pressure, as well as peer pressure, on attending students to stand as a group or, at least, 
maintain respectful silence during the invocation and benediction.  This pressure, though 
subtle and indirect, can be as real as any overt compulsion.”). 
 21. See Newdow, 542 U.S. at 41 (2004) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (citing Lynch v. 
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting), for the suggestion that the 
reference to God in the Pledge has “lost through rote repetition any significant religious 
content,” concluding that “[a]ny religious freight the words may have been meant to carry 
originally has long since been lost”). 
 22. See Marsh, 463 U.S. at 783–95 (upholding the Nebraska Legislature’s practice of 
opening legislative sessions with a prayer by a chaplain paid by the State). 
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reassessment of Marsh’s exceptional status and an expansion of the case’s 
permissive, test-free approach beyond legislative prayer. 
I.  The Marsh “Rule” 
The Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is neither 
clear nor predictable.23  Yet it has remained under the nominal control of 
the same leading case for the last four decades.  Lemon v. Kurtzman24 set 
forth a three-pronged standard that the Court continues to apply today, 
though somewhat grudgingly, and with frequent exceptions:25 
1. First, the statute must have a secular legislative purpose; 
2. Second, its principal or primary effect must be one that neither 
advances nor inhibits26 religion; 
3. Finally, the statute must not foster ‘an excessive government 
entanglement with religion.27 
                                                                                                     
 23. See Mount Soledad Mem’l Ass’n v. Trunk, 132 S. Ct. 2535, 2535 (2012) 
(explaining Justice Alito’s sentiment that the “Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence is 
undoubtedly in need of clarity”); see also Utah Highway Patrol Ass'n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 
132 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (decrying “an 
Establishment Clause jurisprudence in shambles”). 
 24. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
 25. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398–99 
(1993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (comparing Lemon to “some ghoul in a late-night horror movie 
that repeatedly sits up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and 
buried . . . . It is there to scare us . . . when we wish it to do so, but we can command it to 
return to the tomb at will.”); see also Marcia S. Alembik, The Future of the Lemon Test: A 
Sweeter Alternative for Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 GA. L. REV. 1171, 1184–85 
(2006) (discussing the declining use of the Lemon test amid competing constructs). 
 26. Cf. Douglas Laycock, Towards a General Theory of the Religion Clauses: The 
Case of Church Labor Relations and the Right to Church Autonomy, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 
1373, 1381, 1384 (1981).  “The ‘inhibits’ language is at odds with the constitutional text and 
with the Court’s own statements of the origins and purposes of [the] clause.  Government 
support for religion in an element of every establishment claim, just as a burden or 
restriction on religion is an element of every free exercise claim.  Regulation that burdens 
religion, enacted because of the government’s general interest in regulation, is simply not 
establishment.”   
 27. Lemon, 403 U.S. at 613. Lemon’s test has probably survived partially because its 
terms are so malleable that they tend to avoid direct contradiction with countervailing 
frameworks, and partially because there is no alternative framework robust enough to 
command widespread support.  Its banality inspires criticism.  Yet banality may operate as a 
survival mechanism in an area of law where tempers run high and clear standards are so hard 
to articulate.  Compare the proposed “actual legal coercion” standard of Justices Scalia and 
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The Lemon test’s first two prongs carry over from a standard 
articulated in School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,28 a case 
about Bible readings in public schools.  There, the Court held that “to 
withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular 
legislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits 
religion.”29  The Court held that the fundamentally “religious character of 
the exercise”30 trumped the School District’s assertion of “the promotion of 
moral values, the contradiction to the materialistic trends of our times, the 
perpetuation of our institutions and the teaching of literature”31 as secular 
purposes and effects promoted by the Bible readings. 
The Lemon test, as informed by Schempp, should have struck down the 
legislative chaplaincy challenged in Marsh v. Chambers.  For eighteen 
years, Nebraska had retained Presbyterian minister Robert Palmer (not the 
singer32) as chaplain for the legislature at a salary of $319.75 per month.33  
Rev. Palmer offered a daily prayer at the outset of every legislative session.  
For years, Rev. Palmer’s prayers had been explicitly Christian; but at the 
request of a Jewish legislator, Rev. Palmer had altered the prayers to have a 
                                                                                                     
Thomas.  See Newdow, 542 U.S. 1 at 53 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“It is difficult to see how 
government practices that have nothing to do with creating or maintaining the sort of 
coercive state establishment described above implicate the possible liberty interest of being 
free from coercive state establishments.”); see also Lee, 505 U.S. at 640 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting) (“The coercion that was a hallmark of historical establishments of religion was 
coercion of religious orthodoxy and of financial support by force of law and threat of penalty 
”) (emphasis in original).  The test, though capable of misapplication, provides an unusual 
clarity in this area, but its results simply go too far politically. 
 28. Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 (1963) (“The test 
may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and the primary effect of the enactment?  If 
either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the scope of 
legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution. That is to say that to withstand the 
strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a 
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.”) (emphasis added); see also 
STEPHEN D. SOLOMON, ELLERY’S PROTEST: HOW ONE YOUNG MAN DEFIED TRADITION AND 
SPARKED THE BATTLE OVER SCHOOL PRAYER 326 (2010) (“The first two prongs of the test 
had been set in Justice Clark’s opinion in Schempp; the third, “entanglement” prong was 
added in Lemon.”) 
 29. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 222. 
 30. Id. at 224. 
 31. Id. at 223. 
 32. If you are inclined to enter YouTube URLs manually into the address bar on your 
browser, you can see the other Robert Palmer perform “Addicted to Love” here: “Robert 
Palmer – Addicted to Love,” http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XcATvu5f9vE.  It really 
holds up surprisingly well. 
 33. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 785. 
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“Judeo-Christian”34 flavor.  The state published these prayers along with the 
rest of the legislative record. 
Lemon requires a secular purpose, a secular effect, and no excessive 
entanglement.  A secular purpose-and-effect for the prayer program can be 
contrived fairly easily – namely, the prayers’ role in “solemnizing” the 
occasion.35  Yet the undeniably “religious character of the exercise” should 
have trumped the interest in solemnization, just as it had trumped the 
secular purposes offered in Schempp to justify a Bible reading.36  Moreover, 
the salary paid to Rev. Palmer, as well as the controversy wrought by the 
prayers, would seem to offend the “entanglement” prong of the Lemon 
test.37  Under Lemon, it is hard to see how legislative prayer survives. 
But the majority of Chief Justice Burger’s Court apparently found this 
result unacceptable. 38  We are left to ask why.  Some of the opposition to 
striking down legislative prayer was probably ideological; in the years since 
the Warren Court decided Schempp 8-1 against the Bible readings, seven of 
the Warren Court’s nine seats, including six of the Schempp majority, had 
been replaced.  Only Justice White voted to invalidate the Bible readings in 
Schempp and to uphold Nebraska’s legislative chaplaincy in Marsh; he may 
have had concerns about the Court’s image.39  But whatever the majority’s 
                                                                                                     
 34. Id. at 793.  If “Judeo-Christian tradition” refers merely to the incorporation of 
Jewish texts into Christianity, then it is worth asking why we do not hear more about a pan-
Abrahamic “Judeo-Christian-Muslim-Baha’i tradition.”  The answer is that anti-Semitism is 
in postwar America taboo to a degree that anti-Islam and anti-Baha’i are not.  “Judeo-
Christian” gives Christian conservatives a way to subordinate religious minorities while 
avoiding the appearance of anti-Semitism.  The notion of a “Judeo-Christian tradition” 
nevertheless comes across as vaguely patronizing toward Jews whose faith does not 
incorporate specifically Christian theology; the implication seems to be that Judaism itself is 
a now-superseded step toward the development of Christianity.  For an account of the 
origins of “Judeo-Christian” theology that appears to have its origins in American postwar 
politics, see Frederick Mark Gedicks & Roger Hendrix, Uncivil Religion: Judeo-Christianity 
and the Ten Commandments, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 277, 283–84 (2007).   
 35. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 693 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring) 
(“[L]egislative prayers . . . [and other] government acknowledgments of religion serve, in 
the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate secular purposes of 
solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence in the future, and encouraging the 
recognition of what is worthy of appreciation in society.”).   
 36. Marsh, 463 U.S. at 797–98 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 37. Id. at 798–800. 
 38. Id. at 783.  
 39. While Schempp had aroused little controversy, it was largely because the Court 
had already broached the issue of school prayer several years earlier in Engel v. Vitale.  
Invalidating Nebraska’s chaplaincy in Marsh would have opened a new front in a perceived 
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ideological or pragmatic motivations for upholding the chaplaincy, it could 
not do so without either sidestepping or mangling Lemon and Schempp as a 
matter of doctrine.  Nor could the Court plausibly reconcile the chaplaincy 
with either of the broader Establishment Clause models articulated in 
previous cases—namely, a model of a “strict separation” between church 
and state40 or, more liberally, a model requiring “neutrality”41 between 
religion and non-religion.  It may not even be possible to devise a “test” that 
could accommodate the Establishment Clause to a practice that so closely 
resembles a state-financed church service. 
The majority opinion for Marsh therefore did not refer to Lemon, to 
the neutrality doctrine, or to the doctrine of strict separation.  Instead, it 
upheld Nebraska’s chaplaincy “in the Judeo-Christian tradition” based 
entirely on a long history—a revisionist one at that42—of legislative 
chaplains past.43  The Chief Justice found evidence of legislative prayer in 
Congress at the time of the First Amendment’s ratification to be particularly 
persuasive evidence that the Founders could not have intended legislative 
prayer to be unconstitutional.44  Yet the Chief Justice did not seem to make 
                                                                                                     
judicial “war on religion,” just as Engel had some years before.  See, Thomas C. Berg, The 
Story of the School Prayer Decisions: Civil Religion Under Assault.  FIRST AMENDMENT 
STORIES 193 (Richard W. Garnett and Andrew Koppelman eds., 2011); Steven D. Smith, 
Constitutional Divide: The Transformative Significance of the School Prayer Decisions, 38 
PEPP. L. REV. 945, 959 (2011).  
 40. See, e.g., Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947). 
 41. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 443 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“The First 
Amendment leaves the Government in a position not of hostility to religion but of neutrality. 
The philosophy is that the atheist or agnostic—the nonbeliever—is entitled to go his own 
way.  The philosophy is that if government interferes in matters spiritual, it will be a divisive 
force.”). 
 42. See Christopher C. Lund, The Congressional Chaplaincies, 17 WM. & MARY BILL 
RTS. J. 1171 (2009).  
 43. The Chief Justice purported to rely on history as evidence of the drafters’ intent 
rather than as a justification in itself for a long-standing practice: “Standing alone, historical 
patterns cannot justify contemporary violations of constitutional guarantees, but there is far 
more here than simply historical patterns.  In this context, historical evidence sheds light not 
only on what the draftsmen intended the Establishment Clause to mean, but also on how they 
thought that Clause applied to the practice authorized by the First Congress-their actions 
reveal their intent.  An act ‘passed by the first Congress assembled under the Constitution, 
many of whose members had taken part in framing that instrument, . . . is contemporaneous 
and weighty evidence of its true meaning.’” Marsh, 463 U.S. at 790 (1983) (quoting 
Wisconsin v. Pelican Ins. Co., 127 U.S. 265, 297 (1888)). 
 44. Id. at 787–88 (“[T]hree days after Congress authorized the appointment of paid 
chaplains, final agreement was reached on the language of the Bill of Rights. . . .  Clearly the 
men who wrote the First Amendment Religion Clause did not view paid legislative chaplains 
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an argument based entirely on the Framers’ intent, as he seems to argue that 
the continuation of legislative prayer over the centuries has contributed to 
the practice’s constitutionality: “In light of the unambiguous and unbroken 
history of more than 200 years, there can be no doubt that the practice of 
opening legislative sessions with prayer has become part of the fabric of our 
society.”45  It is seemingly the normalcy, the ordinariness of legislative 
prayer that justifies the practice rather than adherence to existing 
Establishment Clause principles.. 
And though competing principles of anti-proselytization and anti-
sectarianism would later be drawn from the opinion,46 Marsh, taken on its 
own, reads as a deliberate attempt to avoid applying a test.47  In that the 
Lynch majority relies on it openly, the case represents the highwater mark 
of the test-free, analogy-based approach. 
Marsh in Lynch 
Under thin doctrinal cover, Chief Justice Burger expanded the Marsh 
approach in Lynch v. Donnelly, the first major nativity-scene case.  In 
Lynch, the City of Pawtucket, Rhode Island set up a lighted Christmas 
display on a private space in a downtown shopping district.  The display 
contained a “talking” wishing well, a sit-on-Santa’s-lap setup, a miniature 
“village” of houses and a church, some lighted stars, a sleigh and reindeer, 
some garland, a “SEASON’S GREETINGS” sign, various cutouts 
including a clown, a dancing elephant, a robot, and finally, a nativity scene.  
Daniel Donnelly, the plaintiff, objected to what he saw as an alarming 
mixture of church and state.48 
                                                                                                     
and opening prayers as a violation of that Amendment”). 
 45. Id. at 792 (emphasis added). 
 46. See Cnty. of Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 603–05 (the anti-sectarianism principle); id. at 
659-60 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part) (the anti-
proselytization principle).  See also Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95 (“The content of the prayer 
is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity 
has been exploited to proselytize or advance any one, or to disparage any other, faith or 
belief.”). 
 47. Avoiding tests seems to be a defense mechanism that kicked in when Chief Justice 
felt doctrinally cornered.  See, e.g., Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986), a free-
speech case in which the Chief Justice avoids referring to a fairly recently-decided 
controlling opinion, and instead offers an ad hoc analysis in order to reach a result the 
controlling test would not have reached. 
 48. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 670–72. 
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Lynch, unlike Marsh, at least purported to apply a test, namely that of 
Lemon.49  Yet in Lynch’s application of Lemon, the Chief Justice created 
something even more freewheeling than Marsh.  In answering Lemon’s 
question whether the nativity scene’s “principal or primary effect is to 
advance or inhibit religion,”50 the Chief Justice simply catalogued a broad 
range of government religious speech practices and asserted that the 
“effect” of Pawtucket’s nativity scene surely could not be any worse than 
the “effects” of any of those: 
[T]o conclude that the primary effect of including the crèche is to 
advance religion in violation of the Establishment Clause would require 
that we view it as more beneficial to and more an endorsement of 
religion, for example, than expenditure of large sums of public money 
for textbooks supplied throughout the country to students attending 
church-sponsored schools, expenditure of public funds for transportation 
of students to church-sponsored schools, federal grants for college 
buildings of church-sponsored institutions of higher education 
combining secular and religious education, noncategorical grants to 
church-sponsored colleges and universities, and the tax exemptions for 
church properties. . . .51 
As in Marsh, the analysis is long on analogical reasoning that serves 
only to move the process of justification offstage.  But in Marsh, the Chief 
Justice at least drew from the history of the particular practice under 
challenge, namely legislative prayer. In Lynch, on the other hand, he drew 
from a diffuse anthology of church-state comminglings none of which 
closely resembled Lynch.52  Indeed, the Chief Justice failed to make any 
“suggestion that publicly financed and supported displays of Christmas 
crèches are supported by a record of widespread, undeviating acceptance 
that extends throughout our history.”53   
The Chief Justice made only a nominal effort to address the remaining 
two elements of Lynch: he found legitimate secular purposes for a Christian 
nativity scene in the city’s desire to “celebrate the Holiday and to depict the 
origins of that Holiday.”54  He also cited the low market value of the 
                                                                                                     
 49. Id. at 679. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681–82 (citations omitted). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 725 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
 54. Id. at 681. 
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nativity scene and the lack of governmental “contact with church 
authorities” as evidence that church-state entanglement was minimal.55 
Normalcy Checking 
The Burger approach in Marsh and Lynch is what I call a “normalcy 
check.”  To determine whether a governmental practice offends the 
establishment clause, a normalcy check asks, “Is this governmental practice 
really any different from putting ‘In God We Trust’ on the money?” “Is this 
governmental practice really any different paying a minister from state 
funds to perform a benediction at the opening of every session of the 
legislature, day in and day out?”  More broadly, “Is this governmental 
practice a normal thing for the government to do, or not?”  Such questions, 
of course, are designed to avoid the direct application of actual legal 
principles to the practice under consideration.  This makes normalcy checks 
easy to disparage.  Yet it also makes them hard to quit, as the post-Lynch 
case law shows. 
To be fair, “normalcy checking” is my epithet, not a name that Chief 
Justice Burger chose to describe his own doctrine.  Then again, Marsh v. 
Chambers does not articulate any other doctrine.  The opinion says so little 
about its methods that the reader is left to reverse-engineer its operative 
principle.  And that principle appears to be that an apparent normalcy 
ratifies a governmental practice—at least in the area of governmental 
speech on religion.  If the practice is widespread, that helps.  If the practice 
is old, that helps.  If examples of the practice date to the founding era, even 
better. 
Such reasoning is more likely to appeal to a member of the religious 
majority than to a member of a religious minority.  For the simple fact is 
that acts of government religious speech will more likely reflect the 
preferences of the voting majority, and generally speaking, membership in 
the voting majority is more likely than not to consist mainly of members of 
the religious majority.  And if the religious majority adds up to a 
supermajority, then members of the religious majority will almost always 
constitute a majority of the voting majority.56  For instance, Christians 
                                                                                                     
 55. Id. at 684. 
 56. Granted, this rule weakens in three-way races in which no candidate receives a 
majority.  I also assume, perhaps imperfectly, that the voting population reflects the religious 
population demographically. 
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constituted eighty-two percent of Nebraskans in 2008.57  (This does not 
include any of the sixteen percent who describe themselves as 
unaffiliated,58 the large majority of whom probably come from a 
background more Christian than any alternative faith.)  If everyone in the 
state voted in an election, and if every non-Christian in the state voted for a 
candidate who won with just over fifty percent of the vote, then Christians 
would still make up sixty-eight percent of that candidate’s voting base. 
To the extent that religious background determines an observer’s 
instincts about church-state propriety, then, it is little wonder that there 
exists such a long tradition of Christian ministry in the Nebraska 
legislature—after all, there has never existed any non-Christian majority 
voting bloc, and there is therefore little political will to take on this 
relatively minor annoyance.59  An unchallenged practice, over time, grows 
into a “long tradition,” establishing a political baseline that the majority of 
Nebraskans feel comfortable with and regard as normal.  But this comfort 
level reflects the size of the Christian majority, not the satisfaction of the 
non-Christian minority. 
By adopting normalcy as the de facto index of legitimacy, the Chief 
Justice simply weighs legislative prayer against the long-standing religious 
majority’s sense of propriety.  To be fair, the Chief Justice, in Lynch at 
least, cited a lack of past “controversy” regarding the long tradition as 
evidence of support among some broad consensus, presumably including 
members of the non-Christian minority.60  Perhaps in Marsh he would have 
taken into account failed legislative challenges to these practices had they 
occurred.  But no one should take it as a surprise that this is not an area 
where the non-Christians of Nebraska would waste their scarce political 
                                                                                                     
 57. THE PEW FORUM ON RELIGION AND PUBLIC LIFE, U.S. RELIGIOUS LANDSCAPE 
SURVEY 100 (2008). 
 58. Id. 
 59. Cf. Lund, supra note 42. 
 60. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 684.  Justice Breyer, as well, emphasized a lack of controversy 
surrounding a long-standing Ten Commandments installation in Van Orden v. Perry, 545 
U.S. 677, 679 (2005) (Breyer, J., concurring) (controlling opinion) (“The determinative 
factor here, however, is that 40 years passed in which the monument's presence, legally 
speaking, went unchallenged. . . .  Those 40 years suggest . . . that few individuals, whatever 
their belief systems, are likely to have understood the monument as amounting, in any 
significantly detrimental way, to a government effort to establish religion.”).  Compare 
Salazar v. Buono, 130 S.Ct 1803, 1817 (2010) (discussing cross meant to commemorate 
World War I) (“Time also has played its role.  The cross had stood on Sunrise Rock for 
nearly seven decades before the statute was enacted.  By then, the cross and the cause it 
commemorated had become entwined in the public consciousness.”). 
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resources.  Nor should anyone discount the possibility of serious 
indignation on the part of religious minorities—after all, litigation threats to 
governmental religious speech reliably produce a huge political outcry from 
members of the Christian religious majority that supports them, and 
incumbent politicians reliably take these controversies as can’t-be-missed 
opportunities to pander to the faithful.61  If the numbers justified it, 
members of “other religions” would speak every bit as loudly on these 
issues.  The fact is that the normalcy checking simply does not attempt to 
account for minority religious adherents’ sense of what is normal. 
The Court would later apply various more formal analyses to the 
problem of state religious speech.  Few later Justices would perform an 
                                                                                                     
 61. In Freedom From Religion Foundation v. City of Warren, 707 F.3d 686 (6th Cir. 
2013), for instance, an atheist organization petitioned the mayor of a Detroit suburb for the 
removal of a nativity scene from a “Winter Welcome” display in the city’s civic center.  The 
mayor refused the petition, and the atheist organization instead sued, unsuccessfully, for the 
right to place its own atheist display alongside the nativity scene.  Id. at 690.  The Mayor 
made political hay of the issue with a public letter to the atheist organization: “[O]ur country 
was founded upon basic religious beliefs.  The President takes the oath of office on the Holy 
Bible. . . .  We have a whole host of other religious traditions in government situations at all 
levels. . . .  Everyone has a right to believe or not believe in a particular belief system, but no 
organization has the right to disparage the beliefs of many Warren and U.S. citizens because 
of their beliefs. . . .  Your non-religion is not a recognized religion.  Please don't hide behind 
the cloak of non-religion as an excuse to abuse other recognized religions.”  Id. at 691.  The 
Mayor also took the message to the airwaves: “Everyone has a right to freedom of religion, 
but I do not believe our Founding Fathers felt there should be a right to attack religion or a 
freedom from religion.”  See Jeff T. Wattrick, Warren Mayor Jim Fouts, Freedom from 
Religion Coalition’s [sic] Fight over Nativity Display is a Holiday Buzzkill, MLIVE.COM 
(Dec. 21, 2011, 2:16 PM), http://www.mlive.com/news/detroit/index.ssf/2011/12/warren_ 
mayor_jim_fouts_freedom.html.  In Texas, to take another example, Governor Rick Perry 
recently signed into law the protection of the salutation “Merry Christmas,” despite any 
realistic threat of litigation over the phrase.  See Texas Gov. Perry signs ‘Merry Christmas’ 
bill into law, FOXNEWS.COM (June 14, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/ 
14/perry-signs-merry-christmas-bill-into-law/.  And then, of course, there is the story of 
Judge Roy Moore of Alabama, who, as a Circuit Judge, displayed the Ten Commandments 
behind the bench and opened court sessions with prayer.  He vowed to defy a judicial order 
to remove the plaque, and received much media attention.  Conservative groups “drafted” 
Moore to run for election to the Alabama Supreme Court.  Moore ran and won.  There, 
Moore commissioned a two-and-a-half ton Ten Commandments monument for the Supreme 
Court’s rotunda.  The Eleventh Circuit ordered the monument removed, Glassroth v. Moore, 
335 F.3d 1282 (2003).  Moore defied the order and was removed from office.  See Jannell 
McGrew, Moore Suspended, MONTGOMERY ADVERTISER (Aug. 23, 2003).  Moore then spun 
the controversy into two unsuccessful runs for Alabama’s governorship, and was finally re-
elected Chief Justice of the state’s Supreme Court in 2012.  Kim Chandler, ‘10 
Commandments judge’ Roy Moore wins his old job back, THE WASHINGTON POST (Nov. 8, 
2012), http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-11-08/national/35505358_1_republican-
moore-roy-moore-chief-justice. 
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analysis as testless as Chief Justice Burger’s in Marsh or Lynch.  Yet in 
many ways, the normalcy checks of Marsh and Lynch express the spirit of 
the case law better than any of the ostensibly more principled analyses that 
have followed them.  Justice O’Connor’s “endorsement test,” discussed 
below, offers judges—or at least judges not bound by the Supreme Court’s 
past constitutional factfinding—near-total discretion to find facts.  But its 
chief competitor, Justice Kennedy’s anti-coercion doctrine, is sufficiently 
malleable to accommodate essentially whatever outcome a judge prefers. 
II.  The Endorsement Era 
Endorsement’s Origin 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Lynch attempted to supply a 
bit of the particularity that the Chief Justice Burger’s analysis lacked.  To 
this end, Justice O’Connor focused the antiestablishment question on 
whether Pawtucket had “endorsed Christianity by its display of the 
crèche.”62  Endorsement of religion, she explained, “sends a message to 
non-adherents that they are outsiders, not full members of the political 
community, and an accompanying message to adherents that they are 
insiders, favored members of the political community.”63  As such, 
endorsements of religion violate the Establishment Clause’s prohibition 
against “making adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person’s 
standing in the political community.”64  She then adapted the first two 
prongs of Lemon—secular legislative purpose, effect of the action—to this 
question of endorsement.  To pass constitutional challenge, the 
government’s actual purpose must not be “to endorse or disapprove of 
religion,” and the effect must not be “in fact [to] convey[] a message of 
endorsement or disapproval.”65  This Lemon test modified by the 
endorsement test went on to dominate future litigation over public displays 
of religious symbols. 
Whatever the theoretical shortcomings of an analysis that places so 
much constitutional weight on purely emotional harms, Justice O’Connor’s 
adaptation of Lemon did promise the Court’s unlawyerly jurisprudence a bit 
                                                                                                     
 62. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 63. Id. at 688. 
 64. Id. at 687. 
 65. Id. at 690. 
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of badly-needed structure.  It also promised a compassionate attitude 
toward the experience of minority religious groups. 
Yet Justice O’Connor’s application of her own endorsement test, even 
in its debut, disappoints on both counts.  In determining whether 
Pawtucket’s actual purpose was to endorse religion, for instance, Justice 
O’Connor wrote that “[t]he evident purpose of including the crèche in the 
larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the crèche but 
celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols”66—a 
watery word salad that if anything has less coherence than the Chief 
Justice’s similar reasoning that “ to celebrate the Holiday and to depict the 
origins of that Holiday”67 somehow constitute “legitimate secular 
purposes.”68 
Justice O’Connor’s argument assumes that the “religious content of 
the crèche”69 can be filtered from its non-religious “content” and, with the 
trial court, that Christmas can be divided into a secular holiday and a 
religious holiday. Under this division, the religious Christmas consists of 
everything involving the baby Jesus, his associates, and his environs, and 
the secular Christmas consists of the remainder, including garland, candy 
canes, gift giving, and all aspects of the Santa Claus phenomenon.70  But 
even if we accept this division (there is reason to doubt, for instance, that 
Santa Claus is a wholly secular symbol71), surely everyone can agree that 
the nativity scene, at least, counts as a religious rather than a secular 
                                                                                                     
 66. Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 67. Id. at 681(majority opinion). 
 68. Id. 
69.  Id. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 70. The trial court wrote that “the courts . . . have recognized the obvious fact that 
Christmas, as celebrated in 20th century America, has a decidedly secular dimension.  This 
is the Christmas whose central figure is Santa Claus and whose themes are the 
nontheological ones of goodwill, generosity, peace, and less exaltedly, commercialism.  Yet 
it is equally obvious that for the many 20th century Americans who practice Christianity, 
there is another Christmas.  This is the “original” Christmas whose central figure is Christ, 
the Son of God, and whose themes are the essentially theological ones of salvation and 
spiritual peace, renewal, and fulfillment.”  Lynch v. Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. 1150, 1163 
(aff’d, 691 F.2d 1029 (1st Cir. 1982) (rev’d 460 U.S. 1080 (1983))).  In this, the court agreed 
with the plaintiff Donnelly, who “stated that he does not consider Santa Claus and the 
Christmas tree to be religious symbols because, unlike the nativity scene, they are not 
referred to or described in religious documents such as the Bible . . . . He distinguished it 
from the other decorations on grounds that the crèche ‘attempted to tell a complete story in 
itself-the story of the birth of Christ.’” Id. at 1156. 
 71. See infra n. 112. 
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symbol.  The intuitive conclusion is the one that the trial court reached: 
namely, that the public display of a nativity scene, a core religious symbol, 
has to offend the Lemon test.72 
Not for Justice O’Connor.  For her, the nativity scene was included to 
not to promote the “religious content of the crèche” but to further the 
“celebration of a public holiday through its traditional symbols.”73  But 
what is meant by “traditional symbols”?  Presumably, by “traditional 
symbols,” Justice O’Connor meant all of the symbols on display.  Yet it is 
not clear how the inclusion of the crèche assists any “traditional symbol” 
besides the crèche.  A nativity scene does not enhance the celebratory effect 
of an inflatable Santa, for instance.  It would seem, then, that the purpose of 
the crèche is to further the celebration of a public holiday through the 
crèche.  This is just a circular way of expressing Chief Justice Burger’s ipse 
dixit that “[t]he display is sponsored by the City to celebrate the Holiday 
and to depict the origins of that Holiday. These are legitimate secular 
purposes.  The District Court's inference, drawn from the religious nature of 
the crèche, that the City has no secular purpose was, on this record, clearly 
erroneous.”74 
As for the second prong of the endorsement test, namely, whether the 
symbol “in fact conveys a message of endorsement or disapproval,”75 
Justice O’Connor again resorted to a normalcy check.  Although the crèche 
had “religious and indeed sectarian significance,” wrote Justice O’Connor, 
“the overall holiday setting changes what viewers may fairly understand to 
be the purpose of the display – as a typical museum setting, though not 
neutralizing the religious content of a religious painting, negates any 
message of endorsement of that content.”76  The crèche, Justice O’Connor 
wrote, should not be considered in isolation, but in context.  The question, 
in context, is “what viewers may fairly understand to be the purpose of the 
display.”  Justice O’Connor’s answer—that the nativity scene is not offered 
as an endorsement of Christianity but as an enhancement of a secular 
                                                                                                     
 72. The First Circuit affirmed but applied a strict scrutiny standard borrowed from 
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982), which had come down since the trial court disposed 
of the case.  Lynch, 691 F.2d at 1094. 
 73. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 691 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“The evident purpose of 
including the crèche in the larger display was not promotion of the religious content of the 
crèche but celebration of the public holiday through its traditional symbols.”).  
 74. Id. at 681 (majority opinion). 
 75. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 76. Id. at 692. 
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holiday celebration—does not come from the ample evidence of what 
Pawtucket residents did understand to be the purpose of the display:  
namely, to “keep Christ in Christmas.”77  Instead, the answer is supplied by 
a normalcy check: 
“[T]he government’s display of the crèche in this particular setting [is] 
no more an endorsement of religion than such governmental 
‘acknowledgements’ of religion as legislative prayers of the type 
approved in Marsh v. Chambers, governmental declaration of 
Thanksgiving as a public holiday, printing of “In God We Trust” on 
coins, and opening court sessions with ‘God save the United States and 
this honorable court.’ Those government acknowledgements of religion 
serve, in the only ways reasonably possible in our culture, the legitimate 
secular purposes of solemnizing public occasions, expressing confidence 
in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of 
appreciation in society.  For that reason, and because of their history and 
ubiquity, those practices are not understood [by whom?] as conveying 
government approval of particular religious beliefs.”78 
Peer through the hazy, pretextual “secular” public purposes, and it 
becomes clear that the real question in Lynch, for Justice O’Connor just as 
much as for the Chief Justice, was this:  is this particular governmental 
invocation of religious symbolism – namely, the nativity scene - worse than 
anything we already do?  Worse than “In God We Trust” on money?  Is this 
normal?79 
                                                                                                     
 77. The trial court, Donnelly, 525 F. Supp. at 1161, discussed letters to this effect that 
were addressed to the mayor’s office: “Although about 10% of the letters expressed the view 
that the nativity scene represented simply the general moral and ethical aspirations of 
goodwill, peace, and love, the clear majority of writers regarded the dispute over the nativity 
scene as implicating religious beliefs and values.  The Mayor's insistence on preserving the 
crèche was lauded by many as a determination to “keep Christ in Christmas” and, more 
broadly, to keep God in American life. Several letters decrying the loss of a City “tradition” 
indicated that their writers viewed the crèche’s central role as portraying the religious aspect 
of Christmas.  Some writers perceived the lawsuit as a confrontation between believers, 
whose right to express their faith was being threatened, and nonbelievers.  In several letters, 
the writer expressed abhorrence for “the minority's” attempt to dictate to the “majority” what 
symbols could be displayed and revered. Some advocated allowing taxpayers or voters to 
decide how the City should spend their money. A few vigorously contested the desirability 
or even the possibility, of separating the religious and political spheres.”  Id. 
 78. Id. at 693 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 79. Cf. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. at 421, 437 (Douglas, J. concurring) (“The point for 
decision is whether the Government can constitutionally finance a religious exercise. Our 
system at the federal and state levels is presently honeycombed with such 
financing.  Nevertheless, I think it is an unconstitutional undertaking whatever form it 
takes.”). 
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Endorsement in Maturity 
By the next time that the court heard a nativity scene case in Allegheny 
County v. ACLU, a majority of the Court had at least acknowledged Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test.80  The Endorsement test reached its mature 
form outside the school setting in County of Allegheny v. ACLU,81 Van 
Orden v. Perry,82 and McCreary County v. ACLU.83  Allegheny County, a 
second nativity-scene case, offered a counterpoint to Justice O’Connor’s 
endorsement analysis in Lynch.  Unlike in Lynch, where the nativity scene 
was accompanied by all sorts of dazzling distractions such as candy canes 
and elephants, the nativity scene in Allegheny stood alone on the courthouse 
steps, allegedly the “most beautiful” part of the courthouse, and was said to 
signify a more explicit, and therefore unconstitutional, endorsement of the 
Christian story.84  Meanwhile, the Allegheny County Court upheld the 
display of a giant menorah; because it was accompanied by a Christmas 
tree, Justice Blackmun, writing for the Court, held that the menorah in 
context served as just one component in a display with the secular purpose 
of celebrating pluralism and, to borrow the County’s impossibly corny 
phrase, “saluting liberty.”85 
Van Orden and McCreary County, companion cases decided sixteen 
years later, together make a similar point in the decidedly silly “Ten 
                                                                                                     
 80. In School Dist. of City of Grand Rapids v. Ball, 473 U.S. 373 (1985), Justice 
Brennan’s majority opinion held that a labor-sharing program between public and parochial 
schools had the impermissible effect of endorsing religion.  In Witters v. Washington Dep’t. 
of Services for the Blind, 474 U.S. 481 (1986), an aid-to-parochial schools case, Justice 
Marshall upheld the program, discussing endorsement as one of a few potential 
Establishment Clause pitfalls that the state of Washington had avoided.  In Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987), Justice Brennan’s majority opinion found an impermissible 
purpose “to endorse a particular religious doctrine” in a Louisiana statute requiring any 
public-school instruction on the theory of evolution to be accompanied by a discussion of the 
pseudo-scientific, pseudo-religious theory of “creation science,” and Justice Scalia’s dissent 
did not take issue with the use of endorsement as a criterion for determining advancement 
and legislative purpose.  The endorsement test played a fairly small role in these cases, 
though, which could have been decided the same way under the pre-endorsement, pre-
Lemon school prayer decisions of Engel and Schempp, as well as the post-Lemon school 
religious display case of Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) and various other aid-to-
school cases applying a confused but unmodified Lemon test. 
 81. 492 U.S. 573 (1989). 
 82. 545 U.S. 677 (2005). 
 83. 545 U.S. 844 (2005). 
 84. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 573. 
 85. Id. at 613–21. 
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Commandments” context.86  In each case, a municipality had installed a 
Ten Commandments plaque outside a courthouse.  In McCreary County, 
the plaque stood more or less alone in a position of prominence not unlike 
that of the nativity scene in Allegheny County.87  The County itself had 
rolled out the monument to great fanfare,88 and after initially running into 
litigation trouble, had supplemented the Ten Commandments a 
“Foundations of American Law and Government” display: a fig leaf meant 
to suggest, absurdly, 89 that the Ten Commandments were being honored 
                                                                                                     
 86. Ten Commandments installations have been placed at courthouses for decades.  
Many of the monuments originated in the 1940’s when E.J. Ruegemer, a Minnesota juvenile 
court judge, sought to post paper copies of the Ten Commandments in juvenile courts 
throughout the country as a source of guidance for youths in trouble.  The Fraternal Order of 
Eagles (“FOE”) worked with “representatives of Judaism, Protestantism, and Catholicism” 
to reach what they believed was a nonsectarian version of the Decalogue.  Cecil B. DeMille, 
director of the film “The Ten Commandments,” took an interest in FOE’s project and 
suggested that, instead of paper, FOE distribute Decalogues engraved on bronze plaques.  
FOE revised the proposal to granite, and local chapters began donating the plaques to their 
communities.  Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 295 (7th Cir. 2000).  The flurry of 
litigation surrounding them is relatively recent.  Activist groups have found two lines of 
attack in these cases.  First they have argued that the installation of the monuments amounts 
to a governmental establishment of religion in violation of the establishment clause.  Second, 
they have argued that the installations violate Free Speech Clause case law: by permitting 
private speakers to install the Decalogues, the argument goes, the state created a forum that 
must be opened to competing points of view.  See Blake R. Bertagna, The Government’s Ten 
Commandments: Pleasant Grove City v. Summum and the Government Speech Doctine, 58 
DRAKE L. REV. 1 (2009). 
 87. See McCreary County v. American Civil Liberties Union of Ky., 545 U.S. at 851–
52. 
 88. Id. 
 89. It bears noting how little merit there is to the claim that the Ten Commandments 
are foundational legal documents.  The First Amendment prevents the first two 
commandments – “thou shalt have not other gods before me” and “thou shalt not make to 
thyself any graven images” – from becoming law because they are establishments of 
religion.  As for “thou shalt not take the lord’s name in vain,” that is also bad law.  “Honor 
thy father and mother” is bad law.  “Thou shalt not covet” is bad law, though to be fair, the 
subject matter cannot be legislated.  So four of the commandments have no analogue in 
American law.  There are two commandments that the American law observes fairly strictly 
– “thou shalt not kill” and “thou shalt not steal.”  A third – thou shalt not bear false witness – 
is enforced in some contexts (perjury, defamation) but not others (teaching of false doctrine).  
But these three prohibitions are preconditions for the possibility of civilized life.  They are 
too universal and obvious to have “originated” with any particular source or group of 
sources.  It is not as if God laid down the rule against perpetuities. This leaves two 
commandments – “remember the Sabbath day” and “thou shalt not commit adultery.”  Each 
of these propositions receives some limited recognition at law, yet it is possible to imagine a 
society that did not follow them at all.  Perhaps – perhaps – Sabbath laws and adultery laws 
can fairly be described as Moses’ bequest to American law.  But to call them a “Foundation 
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not for their religious significance, but for their centrality to American legal 
culture.90  If anything, though, this revision cemented further the message 
that Christianity and American law function as a unit.  The Court held that 
the display unconstitutionally endorsed religion.91 
In Van Orden, on the other hand, the Ten Commandments plaque was 
presented with various displays commemorating the traditions of founding 
settlers in the area.  As with the Allegheny County menorah, the Court held 
the plaque’s religious significance had been offset by an historical 
message.92 
These three opinions - the majority opinions in Allegheny County and 
McCreary County and Justice Breyer’s controlling opinion in Van Orden93 - 
set the style of the endorsement era.  There is, first of all, an obsession with 
aesthetics, semiotics, and “context.”  These themes appeared only dimly in 
Justice O’Connor’s Lynch concurrence, in which she offhandedly compared 
the Pawtucket holiday display and its nativity scene to a government-
funded “museum setting” containing a single work of religiously-themed 
art;94 the exposition in Allegheny County, McCreary County, and Van 
Orden, for better or more likely for worse, is far more elaborate. 
Second, the post-Lynch endorsement opinions filter these aesthetic 
considerations though various reasonable-person analyses.  The Justices 
dispute this reasonable person’s perceptions bitterly.  Indeed, the Justices 
treat the reasonable person so territorially that the construct comes across 
less as a guide for judicial discretion than as a customizable avatar of 
judicial notice. 
Meanwhile, dissenting opinions and disgruntled concurrences fall into 
two broad furrows.  In the first are Justices who favor an endorsement test 
that would do more to advance the interests of nonadherents.  Justices 
                                                                                                     
of American Law and Government” is generous. 
 90. Id. at 870–71. 
 91. Id. at 881. 
 92. Judge Posner praises Justice Breyer’s work in McCreary/Van Orden as 
pragmatically concerned with the politics of judicial intervention.  While in Van Orden the 
Ten Commandments plaque had stood for decades without prior conflict, the McCreary 
display was a recent provocation.  Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 31, 99–102 (2005).  Perhaps a status quo rule concerned with deterring 
aggressors in the wars of church and state would be best.  Indeed, by denying talking points 
to religious fanatics, such a rule may in some sense serve the stated ends of the endorsement 
test better than the endorsement test itself would.   
 93. Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 698 (Breyer, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 94. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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Stevens and Brennan, when they were still on the Court, wrote from this 
angle fairly reliably.  Justice Stevens, in particular, seemed to use the 
endorsement test as a vehicle for the separationist model of religious 
freedom that has mostly gone by the wayside in the past three decades.95 
Judges in the opposite camp urge the rejection of the 
Lemon/endorsement framework.  Nearly everyone in this camp has written 
on the subject: Kennedy, White, Rehnquist, Scalia, Thomas, Alito.  With 
substantial justification, these Justices deride the endorsement test for its 
general lack of clarity.  They also express some justified skepticism that 
constitutional doctrine should rest so heavily on personal offense.  And with 
less justification, they take opportunities to question the validity of that 
offense. 
Yet in search of a purpose behind all of these controversial public 
displays, the accomodationist Justices conjure up policy interests every bit 
as vague and emotionally-based as those of the endorsement test.  The 
government’s decision between adopting religious imagery is typically 
portrayed as a choice between “acknowledgement” of religion, on the one 
hand, and “hostility” toward religion, on the other.  A religiously-themed 
display, the argument goes, reflects only an “acknowledgment” of religion, 
which – who can deny it? – has always played a prominent role in 
American history.  Given the importance of religion to so many people, a 
judicial “extirpation” of religion in government96 would send a message of 
“hostility”97 or “callous indifference”98 toward religion.  This concern with 
                                                                                                     
 95. See Erwin Chemerinsky, A Fixture on a Changing Court: Justice Stevens and the 
Establishment Clause, 106 Nw. U.L. REV. 587 (2012).  It is not clear who on the present 
Court might pick up Stevens’ cause following his retirement.  Justices Breyer, Ginsburg, and 
Sotomayor have signed on to Justice Stevens’ opinions in these cases before.  Justice Breyer 
has rejected strict separationism.  Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 699 (“[T]he Establishment Clause 
does not compel the government to purge from the public sphere all that in any way partakes 
of the religious.”).  Justice Kagan has not yet weighed in on these issues. 
 96. See Schempp, 374 U.S. at 316 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does 
not require extirpation of all expression of religious belief.”); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 
657 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (“Taken to its logical extreme, some of the language [in earlier 
Court opinions] would require a relentless extirpation of all contact between government and 
religion.”). 
 97. See, e.g., Van Orden, 545 U.S. at 683–84 (“This case, like all Establishment 
Clause challenges, presents us with the difficulty of respecting both faces.  Our institutions 
presuppose a Supreme Being, yet these institutions must not press religious observances 
upon their citizens.  One face looks to the past in acknowledgment of our Nation's heritage, 
while the other looks to the present in demanding a separation between church and state. 
Reconciling these two faces requires that we neither abdicate our responsibility to maintain a 
division between church and state nor evince a hostility to religion by disabling the 
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distressed sensibilities, of course, calls to mind the endorsement test’s 
strained attribution of Constitutional weight to emotional harms. 
In short, the case law of governmental religious speech contains more 
complexity than it did under Marsh.  Yet its major contours of a) context 
analysis, b) reasonableness analysis, and c) the supposed dilemma of 
acknowledgment versus hostility do nothing to tame the role of normalcy 
checking.  They simply obscure it.  The case law of the past three decades 
has not replaced Chief Justice Burger’s normalcy check so much as broken 
it up into smaller pieces and reassembled it into a more jagged form. 
The Role of Secular Context Objects 
Aside from Marsh, which relies entirely on “history and tradition,” all 
of the case law in the government religious speech cases rests on the truism 
that a symbol’s meaning varies with its context.  And context does matter, 
even if its ability to dilute the meaning of potent religious imagery is 
frequently overstated.99  Nonetheless, the question of context is so fact-
specific that there is almost always a plausible argument that a given 
traditionally religious symbol has either retained its religious meaning or 
                                                                                                     
government from in some ways recognizing our religious heritage”).  See also Zorach v. 
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 313–314 (1952) (Warning that the Constitution does not contain “a 
requirement that the government show a callous indifference to religious groups. . . . [W]e 
find no constitutional requirement which makes it necessary for government to be hostile to 
religion and to throw its weight against efforts to widen the effective scope of religious 
influence.”); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 845–846 
(1995) (there is a “risk [of] fostering a pervasive bias or hostility to religion, which could 
undermine the very neutrality the Establishment Clause requires”). 
 98. See, e.g., Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 90 (Burger, J., dissenting) (“If the government may 
not accommodate religious needs when it does so in a wholly neutral and noncoercive 
manner, the “benevolent neutrality” that we have long considered the correct constitutional 
standard will quickly translate into the “callous indifference” that the Court has consistently 
held the Establishment Clause does not require.”); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 658 (1989) 
(Kennedy, J., dissenting) (quoting Zorach, 343 U.S. at 313). 
 99. Even a cross is capable of being presented detachedly or ironically in art.  But it 
takes a strong, unambiguous cue to remove the message of endorsement that is attached to it.  
Presenting one of these marks in a museum or a textbook is perhaps the surest means of 
detaching the presenter from the mark’s ordinary meaning of endorsement.  Thus, Justice 
O’Connor in Lynch and Allegheny County, voting to uphold public nativity scenes, 
compared the towns’ holiday displays to museums.  Lynch, 465 U.S. at 692 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 624 (O’Connor, J., concurring).  I think that 
comparison is a stretch.  But see Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette 515 U.S. 753, 770–72 
(Thomas, J., concurring) (offering that a cross under the care of the Ku Klux Klan loses its 
religious meaning). 
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taken on a secular one in light of its placement relative to context objects 
that are said to be unquestionably secular.  This is especially true in cases 
involving physical objects, where judges microanalyze in writing the 
positioning and size of these symbols relative to each other.  Courts have 
squabbled notoriously considerations such as the placement of a nativity 
scene in the “most beautiful” part of a courthouse100 and about the 
likelihood that a viewer in a speeding car would have time to apprehend 
that a cross by the side of the road was a memorial for a state trooper.101  
Judge Easterbrook once remarked that this sort of analysis was better cut 
out for interior designers: “all a judge can do is announce his gestalt.”102 
But there is a similar dynamic in cases that do not involve the 
placement of tangible objects.  In Elk Grove United School Dist. v. 
Newdow,103 the Ninth Circuit had held that the words “under God” in the 
Pledge of Allegiance,104 recited by schoolchildren in public schools, 
impermissibly endorsed religion.105  Such a conclusion is hard to avoid.  
Congress inserted the words into the previously existing Pledge in 1954; the 
bill’s sponsor in declared that the phrase’s purpose was “to contrast this 
country’s belief in God with the Soviet Union’s embrace of atheism.”106  
After granting certiorari, the Supreme Court avoided the Establishment 
                                                                                                     
 100. Allegheny County, 492 U.S. at 579–81, 594–602. 
 101. See Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n v. Am. Atheists, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 12, 20 (2011) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari), in which Justice Thomas sums up the a 
dispute among judges of the lower court in Am. Atheists, Inc. v. Davenport, 637 F.3d 1095 
(10th Cir. 2010) (cert. denied, Utah Highway Patrol Ass’n., 132 S. Ct. at 12): “According to 
the panel, because the observer would be ‘driving by one of the memorial crosses at 55–plus 
miles per hour,’ he would not see the fallen officer's biographical information, but he would 
see that the ‘cross conspicuously bears the imprimatur of a state entity . . . and is found 
primarily on public land.’ According to the dissenters, on the other hand, if the traveling 
observer could see the police insignia on the cross, he should also see the much larger name, 
rank, and badge number of the fallen officer emblazoned above it.  The dissenters would 
also have employed an observer who was able to pull over and view the crosses more 
thoroughly and would have allowed their observer to view four of the memorials located on 
side-streets with lower speed limits.” Id. (citations omitted). 
 102. Am. Jewish Cong., 827 F.2d at 126. 
 103. 542 U.S. 1 (2004). 
 104. “I pledge allegiance to my Flag and the Republic for which it stands: one Nation 
indivisible, with Liberty and Justice for all.”  J. BAER, THE PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE: A 
CENTENNIAL HISTORY, 1892–1992, p. 3 (1992) (internal quotation marks omitted).  
 105. Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 328 F. 3d 466, 490 (9th Cir. 2003) (rev’d sub nom. Elk 
Grove Unified School Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004)). 
 106. 100 Cong. Rec. 1700 (1954). 
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Clause issue by deciding the case on standing grounds.107  But Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, Justice O’Connor, and Justice Thomas all wrote concurrences in 
the judgment that would have upheld the “under God” language on the 
merits.  Both the Rehnquist and O’Connor opinions express variations on 
the theme that proximity to “patriotic” language neutralizes the ordinarily 
religious significance of the “one Nation under God” phrase.108 
Aside from the question of proximity is the question of whether the 
context objects are themselves secular.  This question precedes analytically 
the question of whether the relationship between the secular object and the 
religious object dilutes the religious object’s ordinary meaning, and the 
opportunity it presents for factfinding is less noticeable.109  In both Lynch 
and Allegheny County, for instance, the Court agreed unanimously that 
certain components of the Christmas display were, at least if they stood 
alone,110 secular symbols.  Everyone on the Court reasoned that neither 
Christmas trees nor candy canes nor Santa Claus had more than a tenuous 
relationship with the Christmas holiday’s biblical origins.  These became 
the secular context objects, and the nativity scenes’ meanings depended on 
their association with them. 
Yet an adherent to a non-Christian faith likely would not have seen 
things the same way as the entirely Christian Lynch and Allegheny courts; 
notably, Lynch and Allegheny were decided at a time when no Jewish 
justices sat on the Supreme Court’s bench.111  Identifying Santa and 
                                                                                                     
 107. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5 (2004). 
 108. See id. at 18 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment); see also id. at 33 
(O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 109. The point of a secular reference object is that no one would dispute its secularity 
because the object is so obviously secular.  Yet precisely because secular reference objects 
are thought by the Justices to be obviously secular, the Justices seem not to take seriously 
the possibility that someone else might find the objects to have a religious significance.   
 110. In Allegheny, Justices Stevens and Brennan both held that the Christmas tree was 
sometimes secular, but was lent religious meaning by an accompanying menorah.  See Cnty. 
of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Ch., 492 U.S. 573, 638–43 
(1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also id. at 654 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Interestingly, though, both Stevens and 
Brennan held that the menorah was always religious.  Id. at 643–44 (Brennan, J., 
concurring); id. at 654 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).   
 111. When Justice Fortas vacated what was widely perceived as the “Jewish seat” on 
the Court, President Nixon replaced him with Justice Blackmun, a Protestant, leaving the 
Court entirely Christian for the first time since the appointment of Justice Brandeis by 
President Wilson in 1916.  The Court lacked Jewish representation until President Clinton’s 
appointment of Justice Ginsburg in 1993.  See Christine L. Nemacheck, Have Faith in Your 
Nominee? The Role of Candidate Religious Beliefs in Supreme Court Selection Politics, 56 
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Christmas trees as secular makes some intuitive sense from a Christian 
perspective, as the lack of theological content in the Santa myth means that 
the least religious Christians, or perhaps former Christians who no longer 
believe in Christ, might completely take the Christ out of their own 
personal Christmas while leaving the Santa in place.  In a community 
without any other religious group besides Christians, chances are that even 
the least religious people in the community tell their children about Santa.  
But in a community with a substantial minority-religious population, for 
instance, many of the most observant people will refuse to participate in 
Santa culture precisely because of their religion.112  The Court is correct 
that many non-Christians find ways to participate in Christmas;113 but even 
so, Santa culture still tracks religious identification too closely to be cleaved 
so neatly from religion itself.114 
                                                                                                     
DRAKE L. REV. 705, 715–16 (2008). 
 112. For accounts of varied and often awkward experiences of Jews during the 
Christmas season, see Jennifer Steinhauer, At One Jewish Home, Making Room for Santa, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 20, 2006, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/ 
20santa.html (describing the controversy surrounding a family’s Christmas-themed display 
in a largely Orthodox Jewish neighborhood). 
 113. See Rabbi Michael Leo Samuel, Book Review: A Kosher Christmas: ‘Tis the 
Season to Be Jewish, TEMPLE BETH SHALOM, available at http://www.bethshalom 
temple.com/book-review-a-kosher-christmas-tis-the-season-to-be-jewish/ (last visited Nov. 
15, 2013) (describing complicatedness of being Jewish at Christmastime) (on file with the 
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). 
 114. In the following discussion, Justice Blackmun attempts to holiday of Chanukah 
into its secular and religious components.  Readers from Christian backgrounds (included) 
may see more easily in this passage than in writings about Christmas the awkwardness of 
characterizing a holiday as partially secular by reference to a dichotomy between “religious” 
and “cultural” tokens.  “The cultural significance of Chanukah varies with the setting in 
which the holiday is celebrated. . . . In this country, the tradition of giving Chanukah gelt has 
taken on greater importance because of the temporal proximity of Chanukah to Christmas.  
Indeed, some have suggested that the proximity of Christmas accounts for the social 
prominence of Chanukah in this country.  Whatever the reason, Chanukah is observed by 
American Jews to an extent greater than its religious importance would indicate: in the 
hierarchy of Jewish holidays, Chanukah ranks fairly low in religious significance.  This 
socially heightened status of Chanukah reflects its cultural or secular dimension.”  Cnty. of 
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 585–87.  But all of this begs the question: if Christmas could be 
celebrated as a secular winter holiday, then why would American Jews have needed to 
elevate Chanukah’s status so that it could serve as a Jewish alternative?  The truth is that 
even the allegedly “secular dimensions” of Christmas are still sectarian enough that when 
Justice Kagan was able to make a good joke about it during her confirmation hearing.  When 
asked where she was on Christmas Day, 2009, she responded that “like all Jews, [she] was 
probably in a Chinese restaurant.”  Warren Richey, Elena Kagan Shows off Sense of Humor 
in Confirmation Hearings, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, June 20, 2010, available at 
http://www.csmonitor.com/USA/Politics/2010/0630/Elena-Kagan-shows-off-sense-of-
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There is a similar majoritarian bias at work in the assumption that 
praise in the tradition of an ecumenical “civil religion” can at some point 
become a secular practice through rote repetition.115  These instances of 
“ceremonial deism” become, in a broad sense, the stock secular reference 
objects for government religious speech generally.  Language such as 
“under God” is considered broadly inclusive, notwithstanding the 
population of Americans who practice polytheistic religions, nontheistic 
religions, or no religion.  And though I do not mean to suggest with this 
observation that the Supreme Court’s unanimously Judeo-Christian 
religious background absolutely determines its jurisprudence of government 
religious speech—surely judges are just as capable as anyone else of seeing 
things from someone else’s point of view—I also do not wish to downplay 
the influence of religious and cultural experience on ideology.  Indeed, 
research suggests that even on the almost entirely Judeo-Christian federal 
bench, judges from more majoritarian religious backgrounds (Protestant, 
Catholic) are likelier to defer to the government in religious liberty cases 
than judges from relatively minoritarian religious backgrounds (Jewish, 
unconventional Christian faith).116  It is hard to imagine that a hypothetical 
judiciary composed mainly of atheists would take government defendants’ 
sham assertions of secular purpose—for instance, that a prayer before a 
football game is necessary to solemnize the occasion117—nearly as 
frequently as our more religiously-mainstream Supreme Court does. 
The Role of the Reasonableness Inquiry 
The endorsement test asks whether an instance of government 
religious speech would make the nonadherent observer feel like an outsider 
in the political community, and whether the viewer would see the 
government’s purpose as the endorsement of religion.  Such questions can 
                                                                                                     
humor-in-confirmation-hearings.  The notion that Christmas is in any easy sense a secular 
holiday, makes much more sense in a homogeneously Christian community than in a diverse 
one. 
 115. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (suggesting 
that the “one Nation under God” language in the Pledge of Allegiance has “lost through rote 
repetition any significant religious content”). 
 116. See Gregory C. Sisk et. al., Searching for the Soul of Judicial Decisionmaking: An 
Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 491 (2004). 
 117. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 306 (2000). 
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only be answered at the highest possible level of generalization:  namely, a 
reasonable-person test. 
This is not necessarily a problem.  The law frequently devises 
boundary concepts – “reasonableness,” “good faith,” “best efforts,” to 
regulate questions the law must decide even though it cannot possibly 
articulate a clear standard.118  The law could scarcely operate without this 
final backstop of reasonableness.119  Yet reasonable person standards pose 
problems in cases that revolve in one way or another around political, 
socioeconomic, or demographic categories—race, gender, class, and so on.  
If the question is how a reasonable person would interpret the word 
“airplane,” for instance, it probably makes little difference whether you ask 
a reasonable man or a reasonable woman.  If the question is what a 
reasonable person would perceive to be a hostile work environment in a 
sexual harassment case, on the other hand, the gender of the reasonable 
person makes a lot of difference.120  The government religious speech cases 
raise similar issues because of the rough correspondence between ideology 
and religious background.121 
                                                                                                     
 118. As I observed above, the reasonable person inquiry regulates mixed questions of 
law and fact that do not lend themselves to clearly-articulable standards.  Among these, the 
questions implicated in the government religious speech cases have such a strong political 
character that they do not seem to lend themselves well to any sort of legal analysis. 
 119. For instance, the law cannot possibly enumerate every possible instance of 
negligence in advance.  The reasonable person—the highest possible level of 
generalization—is the only standard capable of discerning which acts fall below the standard 
of care and which do not.  To take another instance, there must be a consistent way to 
interpret contracts.  Yet even if it were possible for some sort of code to give highly specific 
rules for interpretation, the interpretation of the interpretive code would itself call for the 
application of a metainterpretive code, and so on ad infinitum until someone ended the 
misery, asking, “could we just ask what a reasonable person would say about this?” 
 120. If the question is whether a reasonable observer would find probable cause in the 
fact that a teenager ran in the opposite direction when the police showed up, for instance, the 
socioeconomic background of the reasonable observer makes a lot of difference.  See Adam 
B. Wolf, The Adversity of Race and Place: Fourth Amendment Jurisprudence in Illinois v. 
Wardlow, 528 S. Ct. 673 (2000), 5 MICH. J. RACE & L. 711, 715–22 (2000).  Similarly, if the 
question is what constitutes a hostile work environment, the gender of the reasonable 
observer makes a lot of difference.  The Ninth Circuit has analyzed such cases under a 
“reasonable woman” standard since 1991.  See e.g., Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 879–80 
(9th Cir. 1991).  See generally Elizabeth Schoenfelt, Allison Maue & JoAnn Nelson, 
Reasonable Person Versus Reasonable Woman: Does It Matter? 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. 
POL’Y & L. 633, 651–54 (2002); Jacqueline M. Jordan, Note, Little Red Reasonable Woman 
and the Big Bad Bully: Expansion of Title VII and the Larger Problem of Workplace Abuse, 
13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 621 (2007).  
 121. See Gregory C. Sisk, Michael Heise & Andrew P. Morriss, Searching for the Soul 
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In Lynch, Justice O’Connor was concerned with the possibility that the 
state might “send a message to nonadherents that they are outsiders, not full 
members of the political community.”122  This concern for nonadherents 
might suggest that the endorsement test’s author would be conscious of 
reasonableness inquiries’ potential for reinforcing majority biases.  Yet 
Justice O’Connor never framed her reasonableness inquiry in terms of the 
“reasonable nonadherent,” despite urgings from colleagues and 
commentators that she should.123  Instead, she grappled with justices who 
favored a more scrutinizing endorsement analysis over the weight that 
should be given to existence of an offended “casual passerby.”124 
Indeed, it has not been entirely clear over the course of the 
endorsement test’s history whether even the reasonable adherent’s 
viewpoint should be taken into account when a “misperception” occurs.  In 
Capitol Square Review Bd. v. Pinette, seven members of the court held that 
actual perceptions of reasonable people do not matter if they are either 
misinformed or not unusually well-informed.  In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan 
petitioned the state of Ohio for the right to display a large Roman cross 
outside the Ohio statehouse.  The area was designated by state law as a 
public forum “for use by the public . . . for free discussion of public 
questions, or for activities of a broad public purpose.”125  The case law 
holds, roughly, that when a government opens government property to “free 
                                                                                                     
of Judicial Decisionmaking: An Empirical Study of Religious Freedom Decisions, 65 OHIO 
ST. L. J. 491, 502 (2004) (“Jewish judges along with judges from non-mainstream Christian 
backgrounds were significantly more likely to approve of judicial intervention to overturn 
the decisions or actions of the political branch that either refused to accommodate religious 
dissenters or provided an official imprimatur upon a religious practice or symbol . . . .”). 
 122. See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 688 (1984). 
 123. See Capitol Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 799–800 
(1995) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“It is especially important to take account of the perspective 
of a reasonable observer who may not share the particular religious belief it expresses. A 
paramount purpose of the Establishment Clause is to protect such a person from being made 
to feel like an outsider in matters of faith, and a stranger in the political community. If a 
reasonable person could perceive a government endorsement of religion from a private 
display, then the State may not allow its property to be used as a forum for that display. No 
less stringent rule can adequately protect nonadherents from a well-grounded perception that 
their sovereign supports a faith to which they do not subscribe.”); see also Paula Abrams, 
The Reasonable Believer: Faith, Formalism, and Endorsement of Religion, 14 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 1537, 1542–43 (2010) (“If inclusion is a ‘paramount’ Establishment Clause 
value, the critical perspective must certainly be that of the nonadherent.”). 
 124. Pinette, 515 U.S. at 779 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment). 
 125. Ohio Admin. Code Ann. § 128-4-02(A) (1994). 
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discussion,” it forfeits the right to exercise content-based editorial 
discretion over the speech that occurs there; instead, any content-based 
regulation of the speech occurring in the forum must pass strict scrutiny.126  
Yet the Board’s counsel advised it that allowing the Klan to display the 
cross would create a reasonable perception that Ohio was endorsing 
Christianity.  The Board therefore denied the Klan’s application, reasoning 
that “compliance with the Establishment Clause is a state interest 
sufficiently compelling to justify content-based restrictions on speech.”127 
But the Supreme Court held that displaying the cross did not present 
any actual danger of conflict with antiestablishment principles, given that 
the state had not sponsored the cross, but rather had been forced to accept it 
for legal reasons.  From here, the seven-justice majority split into two 
pluralities.  Justice Scalia, writing for Justices Rehnquist, Kennedy, and 
Thomas, wrote that even if the reasonable observer perceived an 
endorsement of religion in the Klan’s display of the cross on public 
property, that perception should not count if it was in fact a misperception.  
Justice O’Connor disputed this point—even misperceptions of endorsement 
should invalidate a law, she insisted, if the misperceptions are 
reasonable128—while straining to maintain that the reasonable observer 
would not have perceived an endorsement of religion in the display of a 
giant white cross in front of the Ohio State House.  “[T]he reasonable 
observer in the endorsement inquiry,” she wrote, “must be deemed aware of 
the history and context of the community and forum in which the religious 
display appears . . . [T]he reasonable observer would view the Klan’s cross 
display fully aware that Capitol Square is a public space in which a 
multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, engage in expressive 
conduct.”129  Justices Ginsburg and Stevens, by comparison, would have 
regarded the inference of a religious message “normal.”130 
                                                                                                     
 126. See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 761. 
 127. Id. at 761–62. 
 128. See id. at 776–77 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“[W]hen the reasonable observer would view a government practice as endorsing 
religion, I believe that it is our duty to hold the practice invalid”) (citations omitted).  
 129. Id. at 780, 782. 
 130. See id. at 802 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“That the State may have granted a variety 
of groups permission to engage in uncensored expressive activities in front of the capitol 
building does not, in my opinion, qualify or contradict the normal inference of endorsement 
that the reasonable observer would draw from the unattended, freestanding sign or 
symbol.”); see also id. at 817 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“We confront here, as Justices 
O'CONNOR and SOUTER point out, a large Latin cross that stood alone and unattended in 
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Justice Scalia disfavors the endorsement test as a measure of 
establishment clause validity, and his interpretation of the endorsement test 
in Pinette is best understood as an attempt to define it away.  If, as Justice 
Scalia contends, a misperception by the reasonable observer should short-
circuit the application of the endorsement test, then the endorsement test’s 
jurisdiction is narrow.  Whether an observer has accurately perceived or 
instead has misperceived an endorsement of religion on the part of the 
government boils down to the question of whether government has in fact 
endorsed religion, which, as I have argued above, is ultimately a question of 
judicial “gestalt.”131  A judge determined to uphold an instance of 
government religious speech, or perhaps determined simply not to apply the 
endorsement test, can always find a “misperception,” even if a lower court 
has not. 
Justice O’Connor’s concurring opinion in Pinette, like her concurrence 
in Lynch, puts very little actual distance on the opinion it concurs with.  In 
Justice O’Connor’s view, the endorsement test still applies whether or not 
the reasonable observer has perceived endorsement accurately or not.  Yet 
her reasonable person must be so well-informed that it is hard to see how 
the misperception could have occurred in the first place.  In real terms, the 
“misinformed” observer loses under either the Scalia or the O’Connor view; 
the difference merely being that Justice O’Connor would have called the 
result a result of the endorsement test, and Justice Scalia would not.  Read 
uncharitably, Justice O’Connor’s Pinette concurrence appears more 
concerned with the maintaining the endorsement test’s leading position in 
the field than with any actual difference the test might make in any 
particular case. 
The endorsement test’s detractors—given more space below—have 
run with the possibilities created by Pinette.  In Good News Club v. Milford 
Central Schools,132 a religious club sought to hold meetings on the grounds 
of a public school after hours.  The school was placed in roughly the same 
                                                                                                     
close proximity to Ohio's Statehouse.  Near the stationary cross were the government's flags 
and the government's statues.  No human speaker was present to disassociate the religious 
symbol from the State.  No other private display was in sight. No plainly visible sign 
informed the public that the cross belonged to the Klan and that Ohio's government did not 
endorse the display's message.  If the aim of the Establishment Clause is genuinely to 
uncouple government from church a State may not permit, and a court may not order, a 
display of this character.”) (citations omitted). 
 131. Am. Jewish Cong. v. City of Chicago, 827 F.2d 120, 126 (7th Cir. 1987). 
 132. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98 (2001). 
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dilemma faced by the state of Ohio in Pinette: it could risk violating the 
speech rights of the group by denying it access, or it could risk creating a 
perception of endorsement by extending support to the group.  The school 
chose to deny the group access.  The Supreme Court denied the school 
summary judgment: “We cannot operate, as Milford would have us do, 
under the assumption that any risk that small children would perceive 
endorsement should counsel in favor of excluding the Club’s religious 
activity.  We decline to employ Establishment Clause jurisprudence using a 
modified heckler’s veto, in which a group’s religious activity can be 
proscribed on the basis of what the youngest members of the audience 
might misperceive.”133 
The Etiquette of Acknowledgment and Hostility 
Throughout the Court’s Establishment Clause jurisprudence, the 
Justices fret over the possibility that the government might, by not 
“acknowledging” religion, express a message of “hostility” toward it.134  
This theme predates the era of endorsement.  In Schempp, for instance, 
while voting to strike down Bible readings in a public school, Justice 
Goldberg, concurring, writes that: 
[U]ntutored devotion to the concept of neutrality [toward religion] can 
lead to invocation or approval of results which partake not simply of that 
noninterference and noninvolvement with the religious which the 
Constitution commands, but of a brooding and pervasive devotion to the 
secular and a passive, or even active, hostility to the religious.  Such 
results are not only not compelled by the Constitution, but, it seems to 
me, are prohibited by it. 
Neither government nor this Court can or should ignore the significance 
of the fact that a vast portion of our people believe in and worship God 
and that many of our legal, political and personal values derive 
historically from religious teachings.  Government must inevitably take 
cognizance of the existence of religion and, indeed, under certain 
circumstances the First Amendment may require that it do so.135 
                                                                                                     
 133. Id. at 119.  
 134. See e.g., Sch. Dist. of Abington Twp., Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963). 
 135. Id. at 306.  The “brooding and pervasive devotion to the secular” line is quoted 
frequently by Justices who would uphold various government religious practices. 
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In Wallace v. Jaffree,136 Chief Justice Burger expressed similar 
concerns.  An Alabama statute had allowed a daily moment of silence in 
schools for “meditation.”  The Alabama legislature amended the state to 
permit “meditation or prayer.”  The Supreme Court invalidated the 
amendment.137  The Chief Justice responded in dissent that “[t]o suggest 
that a moment-of-silence statute that includes the word ‘prayer’ 
unconstitutionally endorses religion, while one that simply provides for a 
moment of silence does not, manifests not neutrality but hostility toward 
religion.  For decades our opinions have stated that hostility toward any 
religion or toward all religions is as much forbidden by the Constitution as 
is an official establishment of religion.”138  Incredibly, Chief Justice Burger 
seems to argue not only that adding the word “prayer” to the statute was 
permissible, but that removing the word “prayer” from the statute would be 
unconstitutional!  “[S]uch hostility,” he wrote in Lynch, would bring us into 
“war with our national tradition as embodied in the First Amendment’s 
guaranty of the free exercise of religion.”139 
Justice Kennedy speaks a good deal more carefully than the Chief 
Justice, but in a concur/dissent in the Allegheny County holiday-display 
case, he cautions that:  
[r]ather than requiring government to avoid any action that 
acknowledges or aids religion, the Establishment Clause permits 
government some latitude in recognizing and accommodating the 
central role religion plays in our society. Any approach less sensitive to 
our heritage would border on latent hostility toward religion, as it 
would require government in all its multifaceted roles to acknowledge 
only the secular, to the exclusion and so to the detriment of the 
religious.140 
It is ironic that Justices so concerned with messages of “hostility” and 
an image of “callous indifference” toward religion do not show more 
                                                                                                     
 136. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985). 
 137. See id.  The majority held that the “or prayer” amendment had no secular purpose 
and was thus invalid under Lemon. See id. at 67. Justice O’Connor concurred in the 
judgment, offering that the case should have been decided under the endorsement test.  She 
would have held that “the purpose and likely effect of this subsequent enactment is to 
endorse and sponsor voluntary prayer in the public schools.”  (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 138. Id. at 85 (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 139. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (citation omitted). 
 140. Allegheny Cnty., 492 U.S. at 657 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part) (emphasis added). 
438 20 WASH. & LEE J. CIVIL RTS. & SOC. JUST. 405 (2014) 
enthusiasm for the endorsement test.  After all, the endorsement test 
prohibits not only governmental messages endorsing religion, but those 
sending messages of disapproval as well.  The “disapproval” half of the 
endorsement formula seems to answer some of the Justices’ concerns about 
“hostility.”  The test could just as easily have been called the “endorsement 
or disapproval” test.  Of course, governmental action that sends a message 
outrightly disapproving of religion is a rarer thing than governmental action 
that sends a message of endorsement, so it is no wonder that most of the 
litigation concerns the “endorsement” half of the “endorsement or 
disapproval” formula.  One could almost imagine the Court refusing to 
order the removal of some religious icon from a public place on grounds 
that the Court would itself violate the “endorsement or disapproval” test by 
issuing an injunction. 
Yet it is easy to see why Justices upholding government religious 
speech do not rely on the endorsement test in doing so.  It would be 
redundant.  A judge who wants to uphold a practice under an Establishment 
Clause challenge only needs to show that the practice being challenged 
does not itself violate the Establishment Clause.  Arguing at the meta-level 
that the judge risked committing an Establishment Clause violation would 
add nothing to the analysis.  And in the process, it would enhance the 
position of the endorsement test, which is all downside for judges who are 
inclined to uphold government religious speech. 
And of course, partaking fully in the endorsement test would mean 
affirming the endorsement test’s uncertain premise that the Constitution is 
sensitive to emotional offense.  That idea, as I have written above, runs 
against the grain of much of the common law, and its weakness tends to 
embarrass arguments against government religious speech.  On this front, 
the supporters of government religious speech have the high ground against 
their opponents, and they have no reason to give it up.  Thus Justice 
Kennedy, on the rare occasions that he has voted to invalidate government 
religious speech, has bent over backwards to avoid writing an endorsement 
test analysis.  An endorsement theory would seem the most natural rationale 
to invalidate prayer at public high school graduations and football games, 
for instance.  Yet in Lee v. Weisman,141 Justice Kennedy invalidated those 
practices based on a relatively hard-to-sell theory that social pressures 
rendered the prayers coercive,142 and in Santa Fe Independent School 
                                                                                                     
 141. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
 142. Id. at 591–99. 
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District v. Doe,143 he signed on to an opinion advancing the same theory 
under a still-more tenuous set of circumstances. 
Justices inclined to uphold government religious speech have little to 
gain from exploiting the endorsement test’s stated prohibition on 
“disapproval of religion.”  Therefore they have not adopted a “disapproval” 
test explicitly, and they are unlikely to do so.  Yet they dabble in the 
rhetoric of “hostility,” “callous indifference,” and “acknowledgement” of 
religion in order to attach a policy backing to an otherwise ambivalent-
sounding legal argument. 
The word “acknowledgement” has served as a particularly useful tool 
for accomodationists.  It can mean two things.  At the weak extreme, it 
means acknowledging the fact that there are people in the world who 
practice religion.  At the strong extreme, it means “acknowledging” the 
verity of religious claims.  The Justices indulge the strong sense of 
“acknowledgment” more often than they should.  Justices O’Connor and 
Rehnquist both would have held in Newdow, for instance, that the words 
“one Nation under God” in the Pledge of Allegiance are not religious but 
“merely descriptive.”144 
More commonly, though, the Justices exploit the word’s vagueness, 
inviting the reader to interpret the term as referring to the social reality of 
religion while leveraging the term in support of practices that endorse the 
theological reality of religion.145  There is a reductio ad absurdum: “your 
proposed rule (whatever it may be) implies that the government cannot 
even acknowledge religion.”  And sure enough, it would indeed be absurd 
to hold that government cannot even admit that people practice religion.  
But that sort of practice—Justice O’Connor’s “museum setting”146 comes to 
mind—is never under challenge.  Instead, the Court hears cases involving 
                                                                                                     
 143. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
 144. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 40 (2004) (O’Connor, 
J., concurring).  See also Van Orden, 125 S. Ct. at 2861 (plurality opinion) (“Recognition of 
the role of God in our Nation's heritage has also been reflected in our decisions.”). 
 145. See Richard A. Posner, Foreword: A Political Court, 119 HARV. L. REV. 31, 99 
(2005).  Posner stated:  
Whether God has actually played a role in the nation's history is a theological 
question, the answer to which depends first on whether there is a God and, if so, 
whether He intervenes in the life of nations.  It is odd for the Supreme Court to 
offer answers to these questions.  But perhaps all that the Chief Justice meant by 
‘God’ was invocations of God and all that he meant by ‘heritage’ was the 
national culture. 
 146. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 692 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
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strong-sense “acknowledgements”—prayers, for instance—the kind of 
thing you are less likely to hear in Justice O’Connor’s “museum setting” 
than in church. 
Ultimately, the question of what is “hostile” to religion and what 
“acknowledges” religion is subject to the same majoritarian “normalcy 
check” analysis as the other big questions.  Long-held practices favorable to 
the religious majority set the baseline.  Reinforcement of the baseline is 
“acknowledgment;” withdrawal from the baseline is “hostility.” 
The perennial “war on Christmas” debate captures this fairly well:  in 
communities traditionally composed almost entirely of Christians, “Merry 
Christmas” is the traditional wintertime greeting.  Because it departs from 
“normalcy,” the lexical shift toward the “happy holidays” greeting has 
inspired paranoia about governmental hostility – indeed, a state of “war” – 
against Christianity.  The state of Texas was recently moved to protect the 
endangered “Merry Christmas” greeting by statute, despite an utter absence 
of litigation or governmental action against the phrase.147 
The bar for “hostility” against minority religions, meanwhile, appears 
considerably higher.  In Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective 
Ass’n,148 for instance, a majority of the Supreme Court upheld against Free 
Exercise challenge the United States Forest Service’s plan to build a road 
through and remove timber from Native American sacred lands, despite the 
Ninth Circuit’s finding “that the proposed government operations would 
virtually destroy the . . . Indians’ ability to practice their religion.”149  
Indeed, the court held it was unnecessary for the government to 
demonstrate a compelling purpose, as the “governmental action [would not] 
penalize religious activity by denying any person an equal share of the 




                                                                                                     
 147. See Texas Gov. Perry signs ‘Merry Christmas’ bill into law, FOXNEWS.COM (June 
14, 2013), http://www.foxnews.com/politics/2013/06/14/perry-signs-merry-christmas-bill-
into-law/. 
 148. 485 U.S. 439 (1988). 
 149. Id. at 464 (quoting Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n v. Peterson, 795 F.2d 
688, 693 (9th Cir. 1986) rev’d sub nom. Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 
U.S. 439 (1988) (emphasis added)).  
 150. Id. at 449. 
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The Coercion Test and the Prospects for Town of Greece v. Galloway 
Despite its controversial status, the endorsement test has dominated the 
government religious speech cases since Allegheny County.  From 
Allegheny County until Justice O’Connor’s retirement in 2005, the test 
enjoyed the support of five justices:  Justice O’Connor plus whichever four 
justices comprised the Court’s “left wing.”  When Justice O’Connor retired 
in 2005, most court-watchers assumed that the endorsement test had met its 
end.  The right-leaning Justice Alito had taken her seat, and Justice 
Kennedy replaced her as the Court’s ideological fulcrum. 
Justice Kennedy has disdained the endorsement test as overly “hostile” 
since Allegheny County.  He wrote: 
Taken to its logical extreme, some of the [endorsement test] language 
quoted above would require a relentless extirpation of all contact 
between government and religion. But that is not the history or the 
purpose of the Establishment Clause. Government policies of 
accommodation, acknowledgment, and support for religion are an 
accepted part of our political and cultural heritage.151   
As an alternative, Justice Kennedy has advanced a more modest limit on 
governmental “accommodation” of religion:   
Our cases disclose two limiting principles: government may not coerce 
anyone to support or participate in any religion or its exercise; and it 
may not, in the guise of avoiding hostility or callous indifference, give 
direct benefits to religion in such a degree that it in fact “establishes a 
[state] religion or religious faith, or tends to do so.” 152   
Under his analysis:  
The crèche and the menorah are purely passive symbols of religious 
holidays. Passersby who disagree with the message conveyed by these 
displays are free to ignore them, or even to turn their backs, just as they 
are free to do when they disagree with any other form of government 
speech.  There is no realistic risk that the crèche and the menorah 
represent an effort to proselytize or are otherwise the first step down the 
road to an establishment of religion.153 
                                                                                                     
 151. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573, 657 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 152. Id. at 659 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). 
 153. Id. at 664 (footnote omitted). 
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The “coercion test,” stated as such, would seem to permit all 
government religious speech.  But Justice Kennedy’s discipline falters even 
in the Allegheny County opinion, where he concedes that “the permanent 
erection of a large Latin cross on the roof of city hall” could violate the 
establishment clause under a coercion analysis.154  “This is not because 
government speech about religion is per se suspect,” he says, “but because 
such an obtrusive year-round religious display would place the 
government's weight behind an obvious effort to proselytize on behalf of a 
particular religion.”155  But this is hard to reconcile with Justice Kennedy’s 
defense of the nativity scene and menorah to the effect that passersby are 
“free to ignore [the displays], or even turn their backs.”156  Surely they 
could turn their backs on the large Latin cross, permanent or not.157  The 
Latin cross hypothetical does not so much come across as an application of 
the coercion principle as an application of Justice Holmes’ “puke test:” an 
act of government “violates the Constitution if and only if it makes you 
want to throw up.”158  Rather than refine the coercion principle, it seems to 
create an exception to it. 
But the Latin cross hypothetical has proved prophetic, as the one time 
that the Court has actually decided a case under the coercion principle, it 
has used the coercion principle to invalidate government religious speech in 
circumstances that are at least arguably less coercive than in the Latin cross 
hypothetical.  The case is Lee v. Weisman,159 in which a public school 
district hired a rabbi to conduct an allegedly “nondenominational” prayer at 
a high school graduation.  Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, urged 
that the prayer would have put “psychological coercion” onto attending 
students that was tantamount to coerced religious practice.  Here, too, 
Justice Kennedy held that psychological pressures created a coercive 
atmosphere.  And without drafting an opinion, Justice Kennedy signed on 
to Justice Stevens’ endorsement analysis in the similar Santa Fe 
Independent School Dist. v. Doe,160 which invalidated student-led 
invocations at football games. 
                                                                                                     
 154.  Id. at 661. 
 155.  Id. 
 156. Id. at 651. 
 157. See Mark Strasser, The Coercion Test: On Prayer, Offense, and Doctrinal 
Inculcation, 53 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 417, 431–32 (2009). 
 158. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 2 (1996). 
 159. 505 U.S. 577 (1992).  
 160. 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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On their plain terms, the endorsement test and the coercion test offer 
radically different approaches to the problem of government religious 
speech.  One would expect that all government religious speech would 
survive under a coercion approach, and sure enough, it does in the opinions 
of the Court’s “right wing.”161  Justice Thomas, in particular, has argued for 
an “actual legal coercion” standard that would ignore mere psychological 
pressures.162  One would also expect a great deal of government religious 
speech to be invalidated under an endorsement approach, and sure enough, 
the Court’s “left wing” has written opinions that would do so.163  But 
Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have presented visions of endorsement and 
coercion that, while opposed in principle, can hardly be distinguished.  If 
unspoken peer pressure is grist for the coercion mill and “One Nation 
Under God” is not a religious endorsement (but rather “merely 
descriptive”), then there is little difference between a coercion test and an 
endorsement test.  Each is occasionally concerned with feelings of 
exclusion and marginalization but ultimately with normalcy.  It takes work 
to stretch the coercion test to cover the same area as the endorsement test, 
and it takes work to squeeze the endorsement test into the same small space 
the coercion test would intuitively occupy.  But the work can be done at the 
expense of some credibility, as Justices O’Connor and Kennedy have 
demonstrated.  Each test is pliable enough to accommodate a wide range of 
outcomes. 
This is not to suggest that tests are completely irrelevant; it is harder to 
justify government religious speech under endorsement than under 
coercion, and harder to justify invalidating government religious speech 
under coercion than endorsement.  A judge forced to decide a case under 
anticoercion principles is likely to reach a different result than under 
antiendorsement principles.  But no one on the Supreme Court is forced to 
apply one test or the other.  There is no possibility of review, and the grip of 
stare decisis, especially in this conflicted area of the law, is tenuous.  
Supreme Court Justices do not appear so much to apply principles in the 
government religious speech cases as vote for outcomes, and they adopt the 
                                                                                                     
 161. See, e.g., Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 631 (1992) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Van 
Orden, 545 U.S. 677 (plurality opinion). 
 162. See James A. Campbell, Newdow Calls for A New Day in Establishment Clause 
Jurisprudence: Justice Thomas's “Actual Legal Coercion” Standard Provides the Necessary 
Renovation, 39 AKRON L. REV. 541 (2006) (emphasis added). 
 163. See, e.g., Van Orden v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677, 737 (2005) (Souter, J., dissenting); 
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). 
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theoretical framework that will embarrass their voting record least over the 
long run. 
The endorsement test governed as long as Justice O’Connor sat at the 
center because four Justices to her left could be counted on to support a 
more stringent form of the test.  Similarly, Justice Kennedy since 2005 can 
count on four Justices to his left to support a more stringent form of the 
coercion test one that does not count psychological pressures as coercive.  
Yet from 2005 until now, the Court has not decided any government 
religious speech case on its Establishment Clause merits.164 
III.  Galloway 
At the time of publication, the Court has not announced an opinion in 
Town of Greece v. Galloway, its second legislative prayer case, and the 
Justices’ remarks at oral argument offered few clues as to what they might 
do.165 
Since 1999, the Town of Greece has held a prayer at the opening of 
each Town Board meeting.  These prayers have been led on a rotating 
“chaplain of the month” basis.  Though the town has no formal policy 
controlling eligibility for chaplaincy or the content of prayers, and though 
the candidates for the chaplaincy were at least initially drawn randomly 
from a list of faith leaders in the community, the vast majority of “chaplains 
of the month” have been Christians.  All of the chaplains between 1999 and 
2007, in fact, were Christians invited by the Town to perform the service.  
Though the Town insists that non-Christians and even atheists may request 
a chaplaincy, it was only in 2008, after the plaintiffs in Galloway began to 
complain of discrimination against non-Christians, that the Town invited 
the first non-Christian chaplains to lead the prayer.166  It is this, the 
                                                                                                     
 164. In Newdow, 542 U.S. 1, 5  (2004), the Court disposed of the plaintiff’s claim on a 
standing theory.  In Pleasant Grove City, Utah v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460 (2009), the Court 
decided the case under the Free Speech Clause. 
165.  Transcript of Oral Argument at 1, Town of Greece v. Galloway, __ S.Ct. __ 
(2013) (No. 12-696) [hereinafter Galloway Transcript]. 
 166. Galloway v. Town of Greece, 681 F.3d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 2012), cert. granted, 133 S. 
Ct. 2388 (U.S. May 20, 2013) (No. 12-696).  The Court stated: 
A Wiccan priestess and the chairman of the local Baha’i congregation each 
delivered one of these prayers, and a lay Jewish man delivered the remaining 
two. The town invited the Wiccan priestess and the lay Jewish man after they 
inquired about delivering prayers; it appears that the town invited the Baha'i 
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overwhelmingly Christian nature of the prayers, that distinguishes prayers 
in Galloway from the “Judeo-Christian” Marsh prayers.167  “Roughly two-
thirds” of the prayers “contained references to ‘Jesus Christ,’ ‘Jesus,’ ‘Your 
Son,’ or the ‘Holy Spirit.’”168 
Marsh approves at least some “Judeo-Christian” legislative 
chaplaincies.  But it is not clear how much further Marsh goes.  The 
history-and-tradition rationale—at least assuming that we accept Marsh’s 
history—would seem to suggest that almost anything goes.  But Chief 
Justice Burger clouds this with his remark in Marsh that “[t]he content of 
the prayer is not of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication 
that the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance 
any one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”169  That careless aside 
shapes Marsh’s entire holding without bothering to explain itself.  Assume 
that we can say what it would mean for a “prayer opportunity” to 
“proselytize.”  Then what is meant by “advance,” as distinguished from 
“proselytize?”  Does it mean the same thing as “advance” in the Lemon 
formula with its prohibition against impermissibly “advanc[ing] [or] 
inhibit[ing]”170 religion?  Or is “advance” offered as the opposite of 
“disparage?”  And what is the significance of the word “exploited?”  Does 
it imply that Marsh is concerned with illicit proselytizing purposes, but not 
proselytizing effects?171 
                                                                                                     
chairman without receiving such an inquiry.  However, between January 2009 
and June 2010, when the record closed, all the prayer-givers were once again 
invited Christian clergy. 
 167. The plaintiffs initially argued that the Town had intentionally discriminated 
against non-Christians, but abandoned that argument after the trial court dismissed a claim 
based on it.   
 168. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 24. 
 169. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 793–95 (1983) (emphasis added). 
 170. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612 (1971) (citations omitted). 
 171. And as an aside, assuming that exploitation of the prayer opportunity does occur, 
what happens next?  Chief Justice Burger’s language implies that there may be a second 
stage of the analysis.  To expand the quotation, he wrote, “[t]he content of the prayer is not 
of concern to judges where, as here, there is no indication that the prayer opportunity has 
been exploited . . . . That being so, it is not for us to embark on a sensitive evaluation or to 
parse the content of a particular prayer.”  Marsh, 463 U.S. at 794–95 (emphasis added). 
Does this imply that if a court does detect “exploitation,” it may then move on to a second 
stage of the analysis involving a “sensitive evaluation” and a “content-parsing?”  I cannot 
imagine that the Chief Justice intended something so needlessly complex; nonetheless, the 
fact that the text even allows this interpretive possibility is testimony to Marsh’s surprisingly 
unworkmanlike drafting. 
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Allegheny County interpreted the Chief Justice’s language to mean that 
“[h]owever history may affect the constitutionality of nonsectarian 
references to religion by the government, history cannot legitimate practices 
that demonstrate the government's allegiance to a particular sect or 
creed.”172  The Court in Allegheny County reasoned that the Marsh prayers 
had satisfied the Establishment Clause only “because the particular chaplain 
had ‘removed all references to Christ.’”173  A number of circuits have taken 
Marsh by way of Allegheny County to imply a requirement that legislative 
prayer be “nonsectarian.”  But the concept only makes so much sense.  
Robert Palmer’s “Judeo-Christian” prayers may not have favored Judaism 
over Christianity or vice versa, but they nonetheless seem to have favored 
both Judaism and Christianity over other faiths.  And, at any rate, as the 
Supreme Court has noted elsewhere, it creates a sort of an establishment of 
religion for a government to permit nondenominational prayers without 
permitting denominational ones.  On this basis, neither the district court nor 
the Second Circuit in Galloway agreed with plaintiffs that the “removed all 
references to Christ” passage in Allegheny County imported a requirement 
that legislative prayer be nonsectarian.174 
Instead, both courts attempted to reckon with Marsh’s and Allegheny 
County’s language as directly as possible, broadly holding that a prayer, 
even if sectarian, must not be “exploited to advance or disparage a belief, or 
to associate the government with a particular religion.”175  But at this point 
the courts part.  The District Court deferred to the Town, holding that the 
“rotating” nature of the chaplaincy made any affiliation with any one 
religion impossible.176  The Second Circuit held that “[w]here the 
overwhelming predominance of prayers offered are associated, often in an 
explicitly sectarian way, with a particular creed, and where the town takes 
                                                                                                     
 172. Cnty. of Allegheny v. Am. Civil Liberties Union Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 
U.S. 573, 603 (1989) (footnote omitted). 
 173. Id. (quoting Marsh, 463 U.S. at 793 n. 14). 
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prayers.”).  
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no steps to avoid the identification, but rather conveys the impression that 
town officials themselves identify with the sectarian prayers and that 
residents in attendance are expected to participate in them, a reasonable 
objective observer would perceive such an affiliation.”177 
Neither the Second Circuit nor the District Court seems to rely on the 
endorsement test to decide the case.  The District Court, though, steered 
clearer of it, avoiding the words “endorsement,” “observer,” and “outsider” 
altogether.  One senses that the District Court did so deliberately. 
Judge Calabresi, writing for the Second Circuit on appeal, does not 
make a similar effort.  He never invokes an “endorsement test” or an 
“endorsement analysis," and there is no citation to Justice O’Connor’s 
concurrence in Lynch, for instance.  But a few notes nonetheless ring of the 
endorsement test.  If Judge Calabresi never refers to an “endorsement test,” 
he does nonetheless use the word “endorsement:” “We conclude, on the 
record before us, that the town's prayer practice must be viewed as an 
endorsement of a particular religious viewpoint.”178  The “objective 
observer” makes an appearance: “We conclude that an objective, 
reasonable person would believe that the town's prayer practice had the 
effect of affiliating the town with Christianity.”179  Still more reminiscent of 
the endorsement test is the Judge’s reference to the feelings of being an 
outsider: “People with the best of intentions may be tempted, in the course 
of giving a legislative prayer, to convey their views of religious truth, and 
thereby run the risk of making others feel like outsiders.”180 
As presented by the Second Circuit, moreover, the case revives the 
Pinette problem: What should be done if a reasonable, objective observer 
would perceive illicit governmental motives that do not, in fact, exist?  The 
Galloway plaintiffs initially argued that the Town had actively sought out 
Christian chaplains and avoided recruiting non-Christian chaplains.  The 
plaintiffs dropped this claim after failing to prove it in court.  The Second 
Circuit therefore assumes (I think charitably) that the Town had the “best of 
intentions,”181 and no interest at all in affiliating itself with Christianity.182  
Having presented the facts in this austere form, the Second Circuit’s 
                                                                                                     
 177. Galloway, 681 F.3d at 34. 
 178. Id. at 30 (emphasis added). 
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argument closely resembles an argument that Justice Scalia’s plurality in 
Pinette rejected outright and that Justice O’Connor’s concurrence-in-the-
judgment embraced only in principle:  namely, that observers’ perceptions 
can trump policymakers’ intent where religious endorsements are 
concerned. Only Justices Stevens and Ginsburg would have given force to 
that argument in Pinette.183  To right-leaning critics of the endorsement 
test—and among these I would include Justices Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, and almost certainly Roberts (but not myself)—the prospect that a 
misperceiving observer might trip the Establishment Clause represents the 
anti-endorsement concept in its worst excess, disrupting completely 
innocent designs in order to protect the fragile sensibilities of a religious-
minority observer who is not only hypersensitive but misinformed as well.  
The Second Circuit, without specifically applying the endorsement test, 
invites a rebuke to the endorsement test from the Supreme Court’s right 
wing.  Counsel for the Town explicitly urged the Supreme Court to take this 
invitation at the very outset of oral arguments.184  
Doing so would require a bit of activism, though, because the Second 
Circuit’s opinion does not clearly place the endorsement test at issue.  The 
opinion is ultimately an attempt to apply Justice Burger’s caveat in Marsh, 
which in some ways itself anticipates the endorsement analysis.  This much 
is true even if Allegheny County’s gloss on Burger’s language is ignored.  
Burger in Marsh is concerned with “disparagement,”185 and stresses that the 
delegates to the Continental Congress in the founding era did not consider 
opening prayers as a proselytizing activity or as symbolically placing the 
government's “official seal of approval on one religious view.”186  There is 
not much difference between Judge Calabresi’s use of the word 
“endorsement” and Chief Justice Burger’s use of the phrase “seal of 
approval.” 
 Nor does it say much that Judge Calabresi would ask a “reasonable, 
objective person” whether the seal of approval had been placed.  The law 
                                                                                                     
 183. See Good News Club v. Milford Cent. Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 129 (2001). 
 184. “MR. HUNGAR: Thank you, Mr. Chief Justice, and may it please the Court: 
The court of appeals correctly held that the legislative prayers at issue in this 
case were not offensive in the way identified as problematic in Marsh, but the 
court then committed legal error by engrafting the endorsement test onto Marsh 
as a new barrier to the practice of legislative prayer.” 
Galloway Transcript at 1. 
 185. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 794–95 (1983). 
 186. Id. at 792.  
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always looks to the reasonable person when it is necessary to interpret a 
message.187  And as for the “feel like outsiders” language, which does seem 
to draw from the endorsement opinions, it only appears in dicta at the end 
of the opinion.   
The case is therefore decidable under Marsh.  The Second Circuit, 
whether or not it interpreted Marsh “correctly,” decided the case under 
Marsh.  The Supreme Court can decide the case under Marsh.  There is no 
need to reach endorsement.  If the Supreme Court does take on the 
endorsement test in Galloway, it will do so purposefully.  Any rejection of 
the endorsement test in Galloway, even if only in the field of legislative 
prayer, can fairly be read as a death warrant on the endorsement test 
generally.  Yet this much is unremarkable, as the endorsement test has been 
a dead man walking for some time.  As I have argued above, the 
government religious speech cases that reach the Supreme Court are 
decided on a voting model.  Endorsement has not had the votes since 
Justice O’Connor retired in 2005. 
More interesting than the fate of endorsement is the future of Marsh 
and the test-free approach.  Crudely, I see three scenarios, or four, for the 
sake of completeness: 
Scenario 1: Removal 
This scenario represents the negligible likelihood that the Supreme 
Court will overrule Marsh and invalidate legislative prayer generally.  In 
this scenario, the Supreme Court will invalidate the practice of opening 
legislative sessions with daily benedictions by religious leaders who may or 
may not be on the government’s payroll.  Remarkably, this outcome is 
simply not a possibility. 
 
                                                                                                     
 187. Moreover, Judge Calabresi says this “reasonable person” must not only be 
reasonable, but “objective.”  This word, in the past, was used by Justice O’Connor in Pinette 
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[government’s] statement in the community.”).  
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Scenario 2: Containment 
This is the boring scenario in which Marsh remains an exception to the 
rule in the government speech cases.  An exception to which rule is hard to 
say with any specificity.  We can at least say, though, that Marsh is an 
exception to the “rule” that some sort of “test” should be applied besides a 
history-and-tradition analysis. 
In the “containment” scenario, the Court will have to clarify the 
meaning of Chief Justice Burger’s remark to the effect that “[t]he content of 
the prayer is not of concern to judges where . . . there is no indication that 
the prayer opportunity has been exploited to proselytize or advance any 
one, or to disparage any other, faith or belief.”188  The Court will also have 
to take on Allegheny County’s argument that the Marsh prayers had 
satisfied the Establishment Clause only “because the particular chaplain had 
‘removed all references to Christ:’ ”189 does it mean prayers must be 
“nonsectarian?”  And if so, what does “nonsectarian” mean if Judeo-
Christian prayers are permitted?190  The Court will either wave its hand at 
this objection or, more likely, reject the requirement of nonsectarianism 
altogether.  These questions seem to me impossible to avoid in Galloway; 
even ignoring the questions would say a great deal. 
In oral argument, Justices Alito and Scalia mockingly challenged 
plaintiffs’ counsel to give examples of prayers sufficiently “nonsectarian” 
to appeal to polytheists, atheists, and “devil worshippers,” and counsel 
admitted that no such prayer can possibly exist.191  Chief Justice Roberts 
and Justice Kennedy, meanwhile, expressed concern that official guidelines 
for the content of prayer would create undesirable governmental 
entanglements with religion192-- a concern that Justice Kennedy first aired 
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years ago in Lee v. Weisman.193   These comments, together with past 
history, suggest that a majority of the Court does not see a nonsectarianism 
requirement in Marsh. 
More avoidable than the sectarianism point is the question of why 
legislative prayer should be treated differently from other government 
religious speech.  But assuming that there is a “why” probably gives Marsh 
too much credit.  My own take is that the Marsh “exception” has no 
principled basis whatsoever.  The case is “unique” because the Court’s 
majority wanted to reach a certain result and the controlling case law made 
that result difficult to reach.  Marsh was an uninspired, ham-handed 
strategy to cope with the problem.  And to make things worse, the opinion’s 
sloppy drafting added unintended complexity—the “exploitation” remark, 
for instance194—that we must today honor as purposeful nuance. 
All of this being said, the Court may take Galloway as an opportunity 
to give Marsh’s exceptional status some sort of a theoretical backing.  But 
there is no need for it to do so. 
Scenario 3: Incorporation 
The easiest and most formal way for the Court to distinguish the 
school-prayer cases of Engel, Schempp, Lee, and Doe is by resort to Marsh 
                                                                                                     
JUSTICE KENNEDY: I mean, I'm serious about this. This involves government 
very heavily in religion. 
MR. LAYCOCK: Well, government became very heavily involved in religion 
when we decided there could be prayers to open legislative sessions. Marsh is 
the source of government involvement in religion. And now the question is how 
to manage the problems that arise from that. 
Id. at 54. 
 193.   
“Principal Lee provided Rabbi Gutterman with a copy of the ‘Guidelines for 
Civic Occasions,’ and advised him that his prayers should be nonsectarian. 
Through these means the principal directed and controlled the content of the 
prayers. Even if the only sanction for ignoring the instructions were that the 
rabbi would not be invited back, we think no religious representative who 
valued his or her continued reputation and effectiveness in the community 
would incur the State's displeasure in this regard. It is a cornerstone principle of 
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence that it is no part of the business of 
government to compose official prayers for any group of the American people to 
recite as a part of a religious program carried on by government, and that is what 
the school officials attempted to do.” 
Lee, 505 U.S. at 588 (citation omitted). 
 194. Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). 
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and the “exceptional” status of legislative prayer—see Scenario 1.  But 
Justice Kennedy, in Doe, made a more substantive distinction, arguing that 
school prayer is coercive in a way that legislative prayer, or some forms of 
legislative prayer, are not.195  Marsh itself made this point,196 and counsel 
for the Town stressed it heavily in oral argument.197 
If a majority of the Court is interested in advancing the anti-coercion 
rationale as a grand unified theory of the Establishment Clause, it can easily 
explain Marsh as a decision resting on anti-coercion principles.  This is 
possible under either variant of coercion theory: Justice Kennedy’s, which 
considers certain psychological pressures to be impermissibly coercive,198 
as well as Justices Scalia’s and Thomas’s, which would not.199 
At oral argument, Plaintiffs’ counsel argued with some force that the 
Town had violated at least Justice Kennedy’s broad version of the coercion 
test: “there's no doubt that before you stand up to ask for relief from a 
governing body, you don't want to offend that body. Adults are subject to 
coercion here. And --and no competent attorney would tell his client, it 
doesn't matter whether you visibly dissent from the prayer or not. You try to 
have your client make a good impression.”200  The argument for 
unconstitutional coercion in Galloway seems at least as strong as in, say, 
Doe, which found coercion in a student-led prayer at a football game.201  If 
plaintiffs win in Galloway, it is far more likely to be on coercion than 
sectarianism grounds.  A victory for plaintiffs therefore almost certainly 
means that the Court has subordinated Marsh to the coercion test. 
Scenario 4: Expansion 
In this scenario, the Court decides Galloway under Marsh while 
dropping hints that the history-and-tradition rationale is in some form a 
sound approach to Establishment Clause problems unrelated to legislative 
prayer.  Recall that in Lynch v. Donnelly, Chief Justice Burger seemed 
poised to expand Marsh’s history-and-tradition rationale beyond Marsh.  
The Chief Justice’s majority opinion devoted a section of the analysis to 
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Marsh, concluding that “it would be difficult to identify a more striking 
example of the accommodation of religious belief intended by the Framers” 
than legislative prayer.202  This discussion laid the groundwork for the 
“normalcy checking” I criticize above, in which all “acknowledgements” of 
religion less extreme than legislative prayer must be permissible under the 
establishment clause.203  I have explained above that I believe a great deal 
of this normalcy checking goes on under the guise of the endorsement test 
and so on.  But as a formal matter, Marsh has been thought of for some 
time as limited to its facts rather than as offering an all-purpose approach. 
Things could easily have been different, though, under a Court as 
conservatively composed as the one we have today.  After all, the effort to 
contain Marsh has always come from the Court’s left.  It was Justice 
Brennan, recall, whose dissent in Marsh first characterized it as a narrowly 
written opinion.204  Justice Brennan objected bitterly in Lynch to Chief 
Justice Burger’s attempt to expand Marsh beyond the boundary Justice 
Brennan had drawn for it in his Marsh dissent.205  The five-vote hegemony 
of the endorsement test from Allegheny County until Justice O’Connor’s 
retirement may well be all that prevented Marsh from flourishing—
metastasizing is probably a better word—into a landmark case. 
There is an appetite to expand the Marsh analysis.  Critics of 
endorsement have put a lot of weight on Marsh-like “history and tradition” 
arguments over the years.206  Justice Kennedy, for instance, dissenting in 
Allegheny County and citing Marsh,207 urged that “[w]hatever test we 
choose to apply must permit not only legitimate practices two centuries old 
but also any other practices with no greater potential for an establishment of 
religion… A test for implementing the protections of the Establishment 
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Clause that, if applied with consistency, would invalidate longstanding 
traditions cannot be a proper reading of the Clause.” 
Outside the Court, as well, and sometimes even outside the 
Establishment Clause context, litigants have tried to turn Marsh’s 
normalcy-check logic to their advantage.208  Defenders of the Defense of 
Marriage Act (DOMA),209 for instance, quoted Marsh in their brief before 
the Supreme Court: “In enacting DOMA and [denying Federal recognition 
to state-sanctioned same-sex marriages], Congress recognized that the 
institution of marriage as between a man and a woman is, to borrow this 
Court's words from [Marsh], ‘deeply embedded in the history and tradition 
of this country’ and ‘has become part of the fabric of our society.’”210  The 
analogy makes sense.  DOMA, much like the Town of Greece’s prayer 
time, is a mean and irrational policy enacted only to pander at the expense 
of an historically and traditionally disfavored minority.  Such policies can 
always find comfort and inspiration in Marsh. 
Conclusion 
In this Article, I have spent a good deal of space detailing the various 
ways that Supreme Court Justices avoid acknowledging the “normalcy 
checks” that govern so much of the case law of religiously-themed public 
displays.  I have focused most, but not all, of my criticism on Justice 
O’Connor’s endorsement test.  It is an obvious target for a couple of 
reasons.  First, in the hands of a swing-vote Justice such as O’Connor, the 
endorsement test can be manipulated to produce almost any outcome 
(which, of course, is true of Justice Kennedy’s “coercion test” as well). 
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Second, the rationale for the endorsement test depends on what at least 
sounds like an unusually soft harm:  namely, a feeling of exclusion.  Not a 
religious oath or a special tax, but just a sense of insult.  But the law rarely 
recognizes claims based entirely on this kind of harm.211  Particularly telling 
is the failure of the “Confederate flag” litigation, in which black plaintiffs 
challenged on Equal Protection grounds the continuing incorporation of the 
Confederate battle flag into official state insignia. 212  The theory behind 
such a challenge has much in common with the theory behind, for instance, 
a Ten Commandments challenge. 213  Yet if anything, one would expect the 
Confederate flag plaintiffs to have a much stronger case than the Ten 
Commandments plaintiffs.  After all, it is hard to imagine how a state could 
possibly send a minority group a more stigmatizing message. 
The endorsement test, in sum, has serious weaknesses.  The same can 
be said for the coercion test.  But we should not be surprised that the 
Court’s efforts to answer the question of government religious speech are 
so awkward.  For these controversies are political matters.  They do not 
lend themselves well to legal reasoning.  It is the Court’s unhappy lot under 
the First Amendment to hear these questions and attempt to resolve them 
through something resembling a legal analysis.  The endorsement test and 
the coercion test fail, but they represent an attempt.  Marsh, on the other 
hand, does not even try.  If only for that reason, Marsh must not grow from 
the exception to the rule.  It is the work of a court so exasperated with the 
concerns of a religious-minority claimant that it cannot be bothered to cite 
the rules before jumping its preferred outcome.  The Establishment Clause, 
however mysterious, must at least require better than that. 
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